Outline for February 20/22, 2002

Reading: §9.3-9.4, §10.2, §10.4.2-10.4.3, §10.5.1-10.5.1.1, §10.5.2, §10.6 except §10.6.2.2

  1. Greetings and Felicitations
  2. Puzzle of the day
  3. Public-Key Cryptography
    1. Basic idea: 2 keys, one private, one public
    2. Cryptosystem must satisfy:
  4. given public key, CI to get private key;
  5. cipher withstands chosen plaintext attack;
  6. encryption, decryption computationally feasible [note: commutativity not required]
    1. Benefits: can give confidentiality or authentication or both
  7. RSA
    1. Provides both authenticity and confidentiality
    2. Go through algorithm:
      Idea: C = M e mod n , M = C d mod n , with ed mod PHI ( n ) = 1.
      Proof: M PHI( n ) mod n = 1 [by Fermat's theorem as generalized by Euler]; follows immediately from ed mod φ ( n ) = 1.
      Public key is ( e , n ); private key is d . Choose n = pq ; then φ ( n ) = ( p -1)( q -1).
    3. Example:
      p = 5, q = 7; n = 35, PHI ( n ) = (5-1)(7-1) = 24. Pick d = 11. Then de mod PHI ( n ) = 1, so choose e = 11. To encipher 2, C = M e mod n = 211 mod 35 = 2048 mod 35 = 18, and M = C d mod n = 1811 mod 35 = 2.
    4. Example: p = 53, q = 61, n = 3233, PHI ( n ) = (53-1)(61-1) = 3120. Take d = 791; then e = 71. Encipher M = RENAISSANCE: A = 00, B = 01, ..., Z = 25, blank = 26. Then:
      M = RE NA IS SA NC Eblank = 1704 1300 0818 1800 1302 0426
      C = (1704)71 mod 3233 = 3106; etc . = 3106 0100 0931 2691 1984 2927
  8. Cryptographic Checksums
    1. Function y = h ( x ): easy to compute y given x ; computationally infeasible to compute x given y
    2. Variant: given x and y , computationally infeasible to find a second x' such that y = h ( x' ).
    3. Keyed vs . keyless
    4. MD5, HMAC
  9. Key Exchange
    1. Needham-Schroeder and Kerberos
    2. Public key; man-in-the-middle attacks
  10. Cryptographic Key Infrastructure
    1. Certificates (X.509, PGP)
    2. Certificate, key revocation
    3. Key Escrow
  11. Digital Signatures

ECS 153, Introduction to Computer Security
Winter Quarter 2002
Email: cs153@cs.ucdavis.edu