Mechanisms

- Entity or procedure that enforces some part of the security policy
 - Access controls (like bits to prevent someone from reading a homework file)
 - Disallowing people from bringing CDs and floppy disks into a computer facility to control what is placed on systems

Policy Languages

- Express security policies in a precise way
- High-level languages
 - Policy constraints expressed abstractly
- Low-level languages
 - Policy constraints expressed in terms of program options, input, or specific characteristics of entities on system

High-Level Policy Languages

- Constraints expressed independent of enforcement mechanism
- Constraints restrict entities, actions
- Constraints expressed unambiguously
 - Requires a precise language, usually a mathematical, logical, or programming-like language

Example: Web Browser

- Goal: restrict actions of Java programs that are downloaded and executed under control of web browser
- Language specific to Java programs
- Expresses constraints as conditions restricting invocation of entities

Expressing Constraints

- Entities are classes, methods
 - Class: set of objects that an access constraint constrains
 - Method: set of ways an operation can be invoked
- Operations
 - Instantiation: *s* creates instance of class c: s | c
 - Invocation: s_1 executes object s_2 : $s_1 \mapsto s_2$
- Access constraints
 - deny(s op x) when b
 - While b is true, subject s cannot perform op on (subject or class)
 x; empty s means all subjects

Sample Constraints

- Downloaded program cannot access password database file on UNIX system
- Program's class and methods for files: class File { public file(String name); public String getfilename(); public char read();
- Constraint:

```
deny( |-> file.read) when
  (file.getfilename() == "/etc/passwd")
```

Another Sample Constraint

- At most 100 network connections open
- Socket class defines network interface
 - *Network.numconns* method giving number of active network connections
- Constraint

deny(- | Socket) when

(Network.numconns >= 100)

DTEL

- Basis: access can be constrained by types
- Combines elements of low-level, high-level policy languages
 - Implementation-level constructs express constraints in terms of language types
 - Constructs do not express arguments or inputs to specific system commands

Example

- Goal: users cannot write to system binaries
- Subjects in administrative domain can
 User must authenticate to enter that domain
- Subjects belong to domains:
 - *d_user* ordinary users *d_admin* administrative users *d_login* for login *d_daemon* system daemons

Types

- Object types:
 - *t_sysbin* executable system files
 - *t_readable* readable files
 - *t_writable* writable files
 - *t_dte* data used by enforcement mechanisms
 - *t_generic* data generated from user processes
- For example, treat these as partitions
 - In practice, files can be readable and writable; ignore this for the example

Domain Representation

- Sequence
 - First component is list of programs that start in the domain
 - Other components describe rights subject in domain has over objects of a type

(crwd->t_writable)

means subject can create, read, write, and list
(search) any object of type t_writable

d_daemon Domain

```
domain d_daemon = (/sbin/init),
  (crwd->t_writable),
  (rd->t_generic, t_readable, t_dte),
  (rxd->t_sysbin),
  (auto->d login);
```

- Compromising subject in *d_daemon* domain does not enable attacker to alter system files
 - Subjects here have no write access
- When /sbin/init invokes login program, login program transitions into *d_login* domain

d_admin Domain

```
(sigtstp->d_daemon);
```

- sigtstp allows subjects to suspend processes in d_daemon domain
- Admin users use a standard command interpreter

d_user Domain

```
domain d_user =
   (/usr/bin/sh, /usr/bin/csh, /usr/bin/ksh),
   (crwxd->t_generic),
   (rxd->t_sysbin),
   (crwd->t_writable),
   (rd->t_readable, t_dte);
```

- No auto component as no user commands transition out of it
- Users cannot write to system binaries

d_login Domain

```
domain d_login =
  (/usr/bin/login),
  (crwd->t_writable),
  (rd->t_readable, t_generic, t_dte),
  setauth,
  (exec->d_user, d_admin);
```

- Cannot execute anything except the transition
 - Only /usr/bin/login in this domain
- *setauth* enables subject to change UID
- *exec* access to *d_user*, *d_admin* domains

Set Up

- These assign initial types to objects
- r recursively assigns type
- s binds type to name of object (delete it, recreate it, still of given type)

Add Log Type

- Goal: users can't modify system logs; only subjects in d_admin, new d_log domains can
 type t_readable, t_writable, t_sysbin, t_dte, t_generic, t_log;
 New type t_log
 domain d_log = (/usr/sbin/syslogd), (crwd->t_log), (rwd->t_writable), (rd->t_generic, t_readable);
- New domain *d_log*

Fix Domain and Set-Up

```
domain d_daemon =
  (/sbin/init),
  (crwd->t_writable),
  (rxd->t_readable),
  (rd->t_generic, t_dte, t_sysbin),
  (auto->d_login, d_log);
   - Subject in d_daemon can invoke logging process
   - Can log, but not execute anything
  assign -r t_log /usr/var/log;
  assign t_writable /usr/var/log/wtmp, /usr/var/log/utmp;
   - Set type of logs
```

Low-Level Policy Languages

- Set of inputs or arguments to commands
 Check or set constraints on system
- Low level of abstraction
 - Need details of system, commands

Example: X Window System

- UNIX X11 Windowing System
- Access to X11 display controlled by list

- List says what hosts allowed, disallowed access xhost +groucho -chico

- Connections from host groucho allowed
- Connections from host chico not allowed

Example: tripwire

- File scanner that reports changes to file system and file attributes
 - tw.config describes what may change
 /usr/mab/tripwire +gimnpsu012345678-a
 - Check everything but time of last access ("-a")
 - Database holds previous values of attributes

Example Database Record

/usr/mab/tripwire/README 0/. 100600 45763 1
917 10 33242 .gtPvf .gtPvY .gtPvY 0
.ZD4cc0Wr8i21ZKaI..LUOr3
.0fwo5:hf4e4.8TAqd0V4ubv ?.... 9b3
1M4GX01xbGIX0oVuGo1h15z3
?:Y9jfa04rdzM1q:eqt1APgHk
?.Eb9yo.2zkEh1XKovX1:d0wF0kfAvC
?1M4GX01xbGIX2947jdyrior38h15z3 0

• file name, version, bitmask for attributes, mode, inode number, number of links, UID, GID, size, times of creation, last modification, last access, cryptographic checksums

Comments

- System administrators not expected to edit database to set attributes properly
- Checking for changes with tripwire is easy
 - Just run once to create the database, run again to check
- Checking for conformance to policy is harder
 - Need to either edit database file, or (better) set system up to conform to policy, then run tripwire to construct database

Example English Policy

- Computer security policy for academic institution
 - Institution has multiple campuses, administered from central office
 - Each campus has its own administration, and unique aspects and needs
- Authorized Use Policy
- Electronic Mail Policy

Authorized Use Policy

- Intended for one campus (Davis) only
- Goals of campus computing
 - Underlying intent
- Procedural enforcement mechanisms
 - Warnings
 - Denial of computer access
 - Disciplinary action up to and including expulsion
- Written informally, aimed at user community

Electronic Mail Policy

- Systemwide, not just one campus
- Three parts
 - Summary
 - Full policy
 - Interpretation at the campus

Summary

- Warns that electronic mail not private
 - Can be read during normal system administration
 - Can be forged, altered, and forwarded
- Unusual because the policy alerts users to the threats
 - Usually, policies say how to prevent problems, but do not define the threats

Summary

- What users should and should not do
 - Think before you send
 - Be courteous, respectful of others
 - Don't interfere with others' use of email
- Personal use okay, provided overhead minimal
- Who it applies to
 - Problem is UC is quasi-governmental, so is bound by rules that private companies may not be
 - Educational mission also affects application

Full Policy

- Context
 - Does not apply to Dept. of Energy labs run by the university
 - Does not apply to printed copies of email
 - Other policies apply here
- E-mail, infrastructure are university property
 - Principles of academic freedom, freedom of speech apply
 - Access without user's permission requires approval of vice chancellor of campus or vice president of UC
 - If infeasible, must get permission retroactively

Uses of E-mail

- Anonymity allowed
 - Exception: if it violates laws or other policies
- Can't interfere with others' use of e-mail No spam, letter bombs, e-mailed worms, *etc*.
- Personal e-mail allowed within limits
 - Cannot interfere with university business
 - Such e-mail may be a "university record" subject to disclosure

Security of E-mail

- University can read e-mail
 - Won't go out of its way to do so
 - Allowed for legitimate business purposes
 - Allowed to keep e-mail robust, reliable
- Archiving and retention allowed
 - May be able to recover e-mail from end system (backed up, for example)

Chapter 5: Confidentiality Policies

- Overview
 - What is a confidentiality model
- Bell-LaPadula Model
 - General idea
 - Informal description of rules

Overview

- Goals of Confidentiality Model
- Bell-LaPadula Model
 - Informally
 - Example Instantiation

Confidentiality Policy

- Goal: prevent the unauthorized disclosure of information
 - Deals with information flow
 - Integrity incidental
- Multi-level security models are best-known examples
 - Bell-LaPadula Model basis for many, or most, of these

Bell-LaPadula Model, Step 1

- Security levels arranged in linear ordering
 - Top Secret: highest
 - Secret
 - Confidential
 - Unclassified: lowest
- Levels consist of security clearance L(s)
 Objects have security classification L(o)

Example

security level	subject	object
Top Secret	Tamara	Personnel Files
Secret	Samuel	E-Mail Files
Confidential	Claire	Activity Logs
Unclassified	Ulaley	Telephone Lists

- Tamara can read all files
- Claire cannot read Personnel or E-Mail Files
- Ulaley can only read Telephone Lists

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Reading Information

- Information flows *up*, not *down*
 - "Reads up" disallowed, "reads down" allowed
- Simple Security Condition (Step 1)
 - Subject *s* can read object *o* iff $L(o) \le L(s)$ and *s* has permission to read *o*
 - Note: combines mandatory control (relationship of security levels) and discretionary control (the required permission)
 - Sometimes called "no reads up" rule

Writing Information

- Information flows up, not down
 - "Writes up" allowed, "writes down" disallowed
- *-Property (Step 1)
 - Subject *s* can write object *o* iff $L(s) \le L(o)$ and *s* has permission to write *o*
 - Note: combines mandatory control (relationship of security levels) and discretionary control (the required permission)
 - Sometimes called "no writes down" rule

Basic Security Theorem, Step 1

- If a system is initially in a secure state, and every transition of the system satisfies the simple security condition, step 1, and the *property, step 1, then every state of the system is secure
 - Proof: induct on the number of transitions

Bell-LaPadula Model, Step 2

- Expand notion of security level to include categories
- Security level is (*clearance*, *category set*)
- Examples
 - (Top Secret, { NUC, EUR, ASI })
 - (Confidential, { EUR, ASI })
 - (Secret, { NUC, ASI })

Levels and Lattices

- (A, C) dom (A', C') iff $A' \leq A$ and $C' \subseteq C$
- Examples
 - (Top Secret, {NUC, ASI}) *dom* (Secret, {NUC})
 - (Secret, {NUC, EUR}) *dom* (Confidential,{NUC, EUR})
 - (Top Secret, {NUC}) ¬*dom* (Confidential, {EUR}))
- Let *C* be set of classifications, *K* set of categories. Set of security levels $L = C \times K$, *dom* form lattice
 - lub(L) = (max(A), C)
 - $glb(L) = (min(A), \emptyset)$

Levels and Ordering

- Security levels partially ordered
 - Any pair of security levels may (or may not) be related by *dom*
- "dominates" serves the role of "greater than" in step 1
 - "greater than" is a total ordering, though

Reading Information

- Information flows *up*, not *down*
 - "Reads up" disallowed, "reads down" allowed
- Simple Security Condition (Step 2)
 - Subject s can read object o iff L(s) dom L(o) and s has permission to read o
 - Note: combines mandatory control (relationship of security levels) and discretionary control (the required permission)
 - Sometimes called "no reads up" rule

Writing Information

- Information flows up, not down
 - "Writes up" allowed, "writes down" disallowed
- *-Property (Step 2)
 - Subject s can write object o iff L(o) dom L(s) and s has permission to write o
 - Note: combines mandatory control (relationship of security levels) and discretionary control (the required permission)
 - Sometimes called "no writes down" rule

Basic Security Theorem, Step 2

- If a system is initially in a secure state, and every transition of the system satisfies the simple security condition, step 2, and the *-property, step 2, then every state of the system is secure
 - Proof: induct on the number of transitions
 - In actual Basic Security Theorem, discretionary access control treated as third property, and simple security property and *-property phrased to eliminate discretionary part of the definitions — but simpler to express the way done here.

Problem

- Colonel has (Secret, {NUC, EUR}) clearance
- Major has (Secret, {EUR}) clearance
 - Major can talk to colonel ("write up" or "read down")
 - Colonel cannot talk to major ("read up" or "write down")
- Clearly absurd!


Solution

- Define maximum, current levels for subjects
 maxlevel(s) dom curlevel(s)
- Example
 - Treat Major as an object (Colonel is writing to him/her)
 - Colonel has maxlevel (Secret, { NUC, EUR })
 - Colonel sets *curlevel* to (Secret, { EUR })
 - Now L(Major) dom curlevel(Colonel)
 - Colonel can write to Major without violating "no writes down"
 - Does L(s) mean curlevel(s) or maxlevel(s)?
 - Formally, we need a more precise notation

DG/UX System

- Provides mandatory access controls
 - MAC label identifies security level
 - Default labels, but can define others
- Initially
 - Subjects assigned MAC label of parent
 - Initial label assigned to user, kept in Authorization and Authentication database
 - Object assigned label at creation
 - Explicit labels stored as part of attributes
 - Implicit labels determined from parent directory

MAC Regions



IMPL_HI is "maximum" (least upper bound) of all levelsIMPL_LO is "minimum" (greatest lower bound) of all levelsApril 12, 2005ECS 153 Spring Quarter 2005Slide #49

Directory Problem

- Process *p* at MAC_A tries to create file */tmp/x*
- */tmp/x* exists but has MAC label MAC_B
 - Assume MAC_B dom MAC_A
- Create fails
 - Now p knows a file named x with a higher label exists
- Fix: only programs with same MAC label as directory can create files in the directory
 - Now compilation won't work, mail can't be delivered

Multilevel Directory

- Directory with a set of subdirectories, one per label
 - Not normally visible to user
 - p creating /*tmp*/x actually creates /*tmp*/d/x where d is directory corresponding to MAC_A
 - All *p*'s references to /tmp go to /tmp/d
- p cd's to /tmp/a, then to ...
 - System call stat(".", &buf) returns inode number of real directory
 - System call dg_stat(".", &buf) returns inode of /*tmp*

- Requirement: every file system object must have MAC label
- 1. Roots of file systems have explicit MAC labels
 - If mounted file system has no label, it gets label of mount point
- 2. Object with implicit MAC label inherits label of parent

- Problem: object has two names
 - $\frac{x}{y/z}$, $\frac{a}{b}/c$ refer to same object
 - y has explicit label IMPL_HI
 - b has explicit label IMPL_B
- Case 1: hard link created while file system on DG/UX system, so ...
- 3. Creating hard link requires explicit label
 - If implicit, label made explicit
 - Moving a file makes label explicit

- Case 2: hard link exists when file system mounted
 - No objects on paths have explicit labels: paths have same *implicit* labels
 - An object on path acquires an explicit label: implicit label of child must be preserved

so ...

4. Change to directory label makes child labels explicit *before* the change

- Symbolic links are files, and treated as such, so ...
- 5. When resolving symbolic link, label of object is label of target of the link
 - System needs access to the symbolic link itself

Using MAC Labels

- Simple security condition implemented
- *-property not fully implemented
 - Process MAC must equal object MAC
 - Writing allowed only at same security level
- Overly restrictive in practice

MAC Tuples

- Up to 3 MAC ranges (one per region)
- MAC range is a set of labels with upper, lower bound
 - Upper bound must dominate lower bound of range
- Examples
 - 1. [(Secret, {NUC}), (Top Secret, {NUC})]
 - 2. [(Secret, \emptyset), (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR, ASI})]
 - 3. [(Confidential, {ASI}), (Secret, {NUC, ASI})]

MAC Ranges

- 1. [(Secret, {NUC}), (Top Secret, {NUC})]
- 2. [(Secret, \emptyset), (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR, ASI})]
- 3. [(Confidential, {ASI}), (Secret, {NUC, ASI})]
- (Top Secret, {NUC}) in ranges 1, 2
- (Secret, {NUC, ASI}) in ranges 2, 3
- [(Secret, {ASI}), (Top Secret, {EUR})] not valid range
 - as (Top Secret, $\{EUR\}$) $\neg dom$ (Secret, $\{ASI\}$)

Objects and Tuples

- Objects must have MAC labels
 - May also have MAC label
 - If both, tuple overrides label
- Example
 - Paper has MAC range:[(Secret, {EUR}), (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR})]

MAC Tuples

- Process can read object when:
 - Object MAC range (*lr*, *hr*); process MAC label *pl*
 - pl dom hr
 - Process MAC label grants read access to upper bound of range
- Example
 - Peter, with label (Secret, {EUR}), cannot read paper
 - (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR}) *dom* (Secret, {EUR})
 - Paul, with label (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR, ASI}) can read paper
 - (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR, ASI}) *dom* (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR})

MAC Tuples

- Process can write object when:
 - Object MAC range (*lr*, *hr*); process MAC label *pl*
 - $pl \in (lr, hr)$
 - Process MAC label grants write access to any label in range
- Example
 - Peter, with label (Secret, {EUR}), can write paper
 - (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR}) *dom* (Secret, {EUR}) and (Secret, {EUR}) *dom* (Secret, {EUR})
 - Paul, with label (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR, ASI}), cannot read paper
 - (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR, ASI}) *dom* (Top Secret, {NUC, EUR})

Key Points

- Confidentiality models restrict flow of information
- Bell-LaPadula models multilevel security – Cornerstone of much work in computer security