## **Outline for February 17, 2006**

## *Reading*: text, §6.4, §9.1–9.3

1. Greetings and felicitations!

- a. Puzzle of the day
- 2. Clark-Wilson Certification and enforcement rules
  - a. C1. All IVPs must ensure that all CDIs are in a valid state when the IVP is run.
  - b. C2. All TPs must be certified to be valid, and each TP is assocated with a set of CDIs it is authorized to manipulate.
  - c. E1. The system must maintain these lists and must ensure only those TPs manipulate those CDIs.
  - d. E2. The system must maintain a list of User IDs, TP, and CDIs that that TP can manipulate on behalf of that user, and must ensure only those executions are performed.
  - e. C3. The list of relations in E2 must be certified to meet the separation of duty requirement.
  - f. E3. The sysem must authenticate the identity of each user attempting to execute a TP.
  - g. C4. All TPs must be certified to write to an append-only CDI (the log) all information necessary to resonstruct the operation.
  - h. C5. Any TP taking a UDI as an input must be certified to perform only valid transformations, else no transformations, for any possible value of the UDI. The transformation should take the input from a UDI to a CDI, or the UDI is rejected (typically, for edits as the keyboard is a UDI).
  - i. E4. Only the agent permitted to certify entities may change the list of such entities associated with a TP. An agent that can certify an entity may not have any execute rights with respect to that entity
- 3. Cryptography
  - a. Codes vs. ciphers
  - b. Attacks: ciphertext only, known plaintext, chosen plaintext
  - c. Types: substitution, transposition
- 4. Classical Cryptography
  - a. Monoalphabetic (simple substitution):  $f(a) = a + k \mod n$
  - b. Example: Caesar with k = 3, RENAISSANCE  $\blacktriangleright$  UHQDLVVDQFH
  - c. Polyalphabetic: Vigenère,  $f_i(a) = a + k_i \mod n$
  - d. Cryptanalysis: first do index of coincidence to see if it's monoalphabetic or polyalphabetic, then Kasiski method.
  - e. Problem: eliminate periodicity of key
- 5. Long key generation
  - a. Running-key cipher: M = THETREASUREISBURIED; K = THESECONDCIPHERISAN; C = MOILVGOFXTMXZFLZAEQ; wedge is that (plaintext, key) letter pairs are not random (T/T, H/H, E/E, T/S, R/E, A/O, S/N, etc.)
  - b. Perfect secrecy: when the probability of computing the plaintext message is the same whether or not you have the ciphertext
  - c. Only cipher with perfect secrecy: one-time pads; C = AZPR; is that DOIT or DONT?
- 6. DES
- 7. Public-Key Cryptography
  - a. Basic idea: 2 keys, one private, one public
  - b. Cryptosystem must satisfy:
    - i. Given public key, computationally infeasible to get private key;
    - ii. Cipher withstands chosen plaintext attack;
    - iii. Encryption, decryption computationally feasible [note: commutativity not required]
  - c. Benefits: can give confidentiality or authentication or both