

# Cryptography I

ECS 153 Spring Quarter 2021

Module 13

# Cryptosystem

- Quintuple  $(\mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D}, \mathcal{M}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{C})$ 
  - $\mathcal{M}$  set of plaintexts
  - $\mathcal{K}$  set of keys
  - $\mathcal{C}$  set of ciphertexts
  - $\mathcal{E}$  set of encryption functions  $e: \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$
  - $\mathcal{D}$  set of decryption functions  $d: \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{K} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$

# Example

- Example: Cæsar cipher
  - $\mathcal{M} = \{ \text{sequences of letters} \}$
  - $\mathcal{K} = \{ i \mid i \text{ is an integer and } 0 \leq i \leq 25 \}$
  - $\mathcal{E} = \{ E_k \mid k \in \mathcal{K} \text{ and for all letters } m, E_k(m) = (m + k) \bmod 26 \}$
  - $\mathcal{D} = \{ D_k \mid k \in \mathcal{K} \text{ and for all letters } c, D_k(c) = (26 + c - k) \bmod 26 \}$
  - $C = \mathcal{M}$

# Attacks

- Opponent whose goal is to break cryptosystem is the *adversary*
  - Assume adversary knows algorithm used, but not key
- Three types of attacks:
  - *ciphertext only*: adversary has only ciphertext; goal is to find plaintext, possibly key
  - *known plaintext*: adversary has ciphertext, corresponding plaintext; goal is to find key
  - *chosen plaintext*: adversary may supply plaintexts and obtain corresponding ciphertext; goal is to find key

# Basis for Attacks

- Mathematical attacks
  - Based on analysis of underlying mathematics
- Statistical attacks
  - Make assumptions about the distribution of letters, pairs of letters (digrams), triplets of letters (trigrams), *etc.*
    - Called *models of the language*
  - Examine ciphertext, correlate properties with the assumptions.

# Symmetric Cryptography

- Sender, receiver share common key
  - Keys may be the same, or trivial to derive from one another
  - Sometimes called *secret key cryptography*
- Two basic types
  - Transposition ciphers
  - Substitution ciphers
  - Combinations are called *product ciphers*

# Transposition Cipher

- Rearrange letters in plaintext to produce ciphertext

- Example (Rail-Fence Cipher)

- Plaintext is HELLO WORLD

- Rearrange as

HLOOL

ELWRD

- Ciphertext is HLOOL ELWRD

# Attacking the Cipher

- Anagramming
  - If 1-gram frequencies match English frequencies, but other  $n$ -gram frequencies do not, probably transposition
  - Rearrange letters to form  $n$ -grams with highest frequencies



# Example

- Ciphertext: HLOOLELWRD
- Frequencies of 2-grams beginning with H
  - HE 0.0305
  - HO 0.0043
  - HL, HW, HR, HD  $< 0.0010$
- Frequencies of 2-grams ending in H
  - WH 0.0026
  - EH, LH, OH, RH, DH  $\leq 0.0002$
- Implies E follows H

# Example

- Arrange so the H and E are adjacent

HE

LL

OW

OR

LD

- Read across, then down, to get original plaintext

# Substitution Ciphers

- Change characters in plaintext to produce ciphertext
- Example (Caesar cipher)
  - Plaintext is HELLO WORLD
  - Change each letter to the third letter following it (X goes to A, Y to B, Z to C)
    - Key is 3, usually written as letter 'D'
  - Ciphertext is KHOOR ZRUOG

# Attacking the Cipher

- Exhaustive search
  - If the key space is small enough, try all possible keys until you find the right one
  - Caesar cipher has 26 possible keys
- Statistical analysis
  - Compare to 1-gram model of English

# Statistical Attack

- Compute frequency of each letter in ciphertext:

|   |     |   |     |   |     |   |     |
|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|---|-----|
| G | 0.1 | H | 0.1 | K | 0.1 | O | 0.3 |
| R | 0.2 | U | 0.1 | Z | 0.1 |   |     |

- Apply 1-gram model of English
  - Frequency of characters (1-grams) in English is on next slide

# Character Frequencies

|   |         |   |         |   |         |   |         |
|---|---------|---|---------|---|---------|---|---------|
| a | 0.07984 | h | 0.06384 | n | 0.06876 | t | 0.09058 |
| b | 0.01511 | i | 0.07000 | o | 0.07691 | u | 0.02844 |
| c | 0.02504 | j | 0.00131 | p | 0.01741 | v | 0.01056 |
| d | 0.04260 | k | 0.00741 | q | 0.00107 | w | 0.02304 |
| e | 0.12452 | l | 0.03961 | r | 0.05912 | x | 0.00159 |
| f | 0.02262 | m | 0.02629 | s | 0.06333 | y | 0.02028 |
| g | 0.02013 |   |         |   |         | z | 0.00057 |

# Statistical Analysis

- $f(c)$  frequency of character  $c$  in ciphertext
- $\varphi(i)$  correlation of frequency of letters in ciphertext with corresponding letters in English, assuming key is  $i$ 
  - $\varphi(i) = \sum_{0 \leq c \leq 25} f(c)p(c - i)$  so here,  
$$\varphi(i) = 0.1 p(6 - i) + 0.1 p(7 - i) + 0.1 p(10 - i) + 0.3 p(14 - i) + 0.2 p(17 - i) + 0.1 p(20 - i) + 0.1 p(25 - i)$$
  - $p(x)$  is frequency of character  $x$  in English

# Correlation: $\varphi(i)$ for $0 \leq i \leq 25$

| $i$ | $\varphi(i)$ | $i$ | $\varphi(i)$ | $i$ | $\varphi(i)$ | $i$ | $\varphi(i)$ |
|-----|--------------|-----|--------------|-----|--------------|-----|--------------|
| 0   | 0.0469       | 7   | 0.0461       | 13  | 0.0505       | 19  | 0.0312       |
| 1   | 0.0393       | 8   | 0.0194       | 14  | 0.0561       | 20  | 0.0287       |
| 2   | 0.0396       | 9   | 0.0286       | 15  | 0.0215       | 21  | 0.0526       |
| 3   | 0.0586       | 10  | 0.0631       | 16  | 0.0306       | 22  | 0.0398       |
| 4   | 0.0259       | 11  | 0.0280       | 17  | 0.0386       | 23  | 0.0338       |
| 5   | 0.0165       | 12  | 0.0318       | 18  | 0.0317       | 24  | 0.0320       |
| 6   | 0.0676       |     |              |     |              | 25  | 0.0443       |



# The Result

- Most probable keys, based on  $\varphi$ :
  - $i = 6$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0676$ 
    - plaintext EBIIL TLOLA
  - $i = 10$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0631$ 
    - plaintext AXEEH PHKEW
  - $i = 14$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0561$ 
    - plaintext WTAAD LDGAS
  - $i = 3$ ,  $\varphi(i) = 0.0586$ 
    - plaintext HELLO WORLD
- Only English phrase is for  $i = 3$ 
  - That's the key (3 or 'D')

# Caesar's Problem

- Key is too short
  - Can be found by exhaustive search
  - Statistical frequencies not concealed well
    - They look too much like regular English letters
- So make it longer
  - Multiple letters in key
  - Idea is to smooth the statistical frequencies to make cryptanalysis harder

# Vigènere Cipher

- Like Caesar cipher, but use a phrase
  - So it's effectively multiple Caesar ciphers
- Example
  - Message A LIMERICK PACKS LAUGHS ANATOMICAL
  - Key BENCH
  - Encipher using Caesar cipher for each letter:

|        |                                |
|--------|--------------------------------|
| key    | BENCHBENCHBENCHBENCHBENCHBENCH |
| plain  | ALIMERICKPACKSLAUGHSANATOMICAL |
| cipher | BPVOLSMPMWBGXUSBYTJZBRNVVNMPCS |

# Relevant Parts of Tableau

|          |          |          |          |          |          |
|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| <i>A</i> | <i>B</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>H</i> | <i>N</i> |
| <i>C</i> | <i>D</i> | <i>C</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>H</i> | <i>N</i> |
| <i>E</i> | <i>F</i> | <i>E</i> | <i>G</i> | <i>J</i> | <i>P</i> |
| <i>G</i> | <i>H</i> | <i>G</i> | <i>I</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>R</i> |
| <i>H</i> | <i>I</i> | <i>I</i> | <i>K</i> | <i>N</i> | <i>T</i> |
| <i>I</i> | <i>J</i> | <i>J</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>O</i> | <i>U</i> |
| <i>K</i> | <i>L</i> | <i>K</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>P</i> | <i>V</i> |
| <i>L</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>M</i> | <i>N</i> | <i>Q</i> | <i>X</i> |
| <i>M</i> | <i>N</i> | <i>N</i> | <i>O</i> | <i>R</i> | <i>Y</i> |
| <i>N</i> | <i>O</i> | <i>O</i> | <i>P</i> | <i>S</i> | <i>Z</i> |
| <i>O</i> | <i>P</i> | <i>P</i> | <i>Q</i> | <i>T</i> | <i>A</i> |
| <i>P</i> | <i>Q</i> | <i>Q</i> | <i>R</i> | <i>U</i> | <i>B</i> |
| <i>R</i> | <i>S</i> | <i>R</i> | <i>S</i> | <i>V</i> | <i>C</i> |
| <i>S</i> | <i>T</i> | <i>T</i> | <i>T</i> | <i>W</i> | <i>E</i> |
| <i>T</i> | <i>U</i> | <i>U</i> | <i>V</i> | <i>Y</i> | <i>F</i> |
| <i>U</i> | <i>V</i> | <i>V</i> | <i>W</i> | <i>Z</i> | <i>G</i> |
|          |          |          | <i>X</i> | <i>A</i> | <i>H</i> |
|          |          |          | <i>Y</i> | <i>B</i> |          |

- Tableau shown has relevant rows, columns only
  - Columns correspond to letters from the key
  - Rows correspond to letters from the message
- Example encipherments:
  - key B, letter R: follow B column down to R row (giving “S”)
  - Key H, letter L: follow H column down to L row (giving “S”)

# Useful Terms

- *period*: length of key
  - In earlier example, period is 3
- *tableau*: table used to encipher and decipher
  - Vigenere cipher has key letters on top, plaintext letters on the left
- *polyalphabetic*: the key has several different letters
  - Caesar cipher is monoalphabetic

# Attacking the Cipher

- Approach
  - Establish period; call it  $n$
  - Break message into  $n$  parts, each part being enciphered using the same key letter
  - Solve each part; you can leverage one part from another
- We will show each step

# The Target Cipher

- We want to break this cipher:

ADQYS MIUSB OXKKT MIBHK IZOOO EQOOG IFBAG KAUMF  
VVTAA CIDTW MOCIO EQOOG BMBFV ZGGWP CIEKQ HSNEW  
VECNE DLAAV RWKXS VNSVP HCEUT QOIOF MEGJS WTPCH  
AJMOC HIUIX

# Establish Period

- Kasiski: *repetitions in the ciphertext occur when characters of the key appear over the same characters in the plaintext*
- Example:

```
key      VIGVIGVIGVIGVIGV
plain    THEBOYHASTHEBALL
cipher   OPKWECIYOPKWIRG
```

Note the key and plaintext line up over the repetitions (underlined). As distance between repetitions is 9, the period is a factor of 9 (that is, 1, 3, or 9)



# Repetitions in Example

| Letters | Start | End | Gap Length | Gap Length Factors |
|---------|-------|-----|------------|--------------------|
| OEQOOG  | 24    | 54  | 30         | 2, 3, 5            |
| MOC     | 50    | 122 | 72         | 2, 2, 2, 3, 3      |

# Estimate of Period

- OEQOOG is probably not a coincidence
  - It's too long for that
  - Period may be 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 15, or 30
- MOC is also probably not a coincidence
  - Period may be 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 12, 18, 24, 36, or 72
- Period of 2 or 3 is probably too short (but maybe not)
- Begin with period of 6

# Check on Period

- Index of coincidence is probability that two randomly chosen letters from ciphertext will be the same
- Tabulated for different periods:

1      0.0660

2      0.0520

3      0.0473

6      0.0427

# Compute IC for an Alphabet

- $IC = [n(n-1)]^{-1} \sum_{0 \leq i \leq 25} [F_i(F_i-1)]$ 
  - where  $n$  is length of ciphertext and  $F_i$  the number of times character  $i$  occurs in ciphertext
- For the given ciphertext,  $IC = 0.0433$ 
  - Indicates a key of length 5 or 6
  - A statistical measure, so it can be in error, but it agrees with the previous estimate (which was 6)

# Splitting Into Alphabets

alphabet 1: AIKHOIATTOBGEEERNEOSAI

alphabet 2: DUKKEFUAWEMGKWDWSUFWJU

alphabet 3: QSTIQBMAMQBWQVLKVTMTMI

alphabet 4: YBMZOAFCCOOPHEAXPQEPOX

alphabet 5: SOIOOGVICOVCSVASHOGCC

alphabet 6: MXBOGKVDIGZINNVVCIJHH

- ICs (#1, 0.0692; #2, 0.0779; #3, 0.0779; #4, 0.0562; #5, 0.1238; #6, 0.0429) indicate all alphabets have period 1, except #4 (between 1 and 2) and #6 (between 5 and 6); assume statistical variance

# Frequency Examination

| # | A | B | C | D | E | F | G | H | I | J | K | L | M | N | O | P | Q | R | S | T | U | V | W | X | Y | Z |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 3 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 1 | 3 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 4 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 5 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 6 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 |
|   | H | M | M | M | H | M | M | H | H | M | M | M | M | H | H | M | L | H | H | H | M | L | L | L | L | L |

The last row has general letter frequencies (H high, M medium, L low)

# Begin Decryption

- First matches characteristics of unshifted alphabet
- Third matches if I shifted to A
- Sixth matches if V shifted to A
- Substitute into ciphertext (bold are substitutions)

**ADIYS RIUKB OCKKL MIGHK AZOTO EIOOL IFTAG**  
**PAUEF VATAS CIITW EOCNO EIOOL BMTFV EGGOP**  
**CNEKI HSSEW NECSE DDAAA RWCXS ANSNP HHEUL**  
**QONOF EEGOS WLPCM AJEOC MIUAX**

# Look For Clues

- **AJE** in last line suggests “are”, meaning second alphabet maps A into S:

**ALIYS RICKB OCKSL MIGHS AZOTO MIOOL INTAG**  
**PACEF VATIS CIITE EOCNO MIOOL BUTFV EGOOP**  
**CNESI HSSEE NECSE LDAAA RECXS ANANP HHECL**  
**QONON EEGOS ELPCM AREOC MICAX**



# Next Alphabet

- **MICAX** in last line suggests “mical” (a common ending for an adjective), meaning fourth alphabet maps O into A:

**ALIMS RICKP OCKSL AIGHS ANOTO MICOL INTOG**  
**PACET VATIS QIITE ECCNO MICOL BUTTV EGOOD**  
**CNESI VSSEE NSCSE LDOAA RECLS ANAND HHECL**  
**EONON ESGOS ELDCM ARECC MICAL**

# Got It!

- **QI** means that U maps into I, as Q is always followed by U:

**ALIME RICKP ACKSL AUGHS ANATO MICAL INTOS**  
**PACET HATIS QUITE ECONO MICAL BUTTH EGOOD**  
**ONESI VESEE NSOSE LDOMA RECLE ANAND THECL**  
**EANON ESSOS ELDOM ARECO MICAL**

# One-Time Pad

- A Vigenère cipher with a random key at least as long as the message
  - Provably unbreakable
  - Why? Look at ciphertext DXQR. Equally likely to correspond to plaintext DOIT (key AJIY) and to plaintext DONT (key AJDY) and any other 4 letters
  - Warning: keys *must* be random, or you can attack the cipher by trying to regenerate the key
    - Approximations, such as using pseudorandom number generators to generate keys, are *not* random

# Overview of the DES

- A block cipher:
  - encrypts blocks of 64 bits using a 64 bit key
  - outputs 64 bits of ciphertext
- A product cipher
  - basic unit is the bit
  - performs both substitution and transposition (permutation) on the bits
- Cipher consists of 16 rounds (iterations) each with a 48 bit round key generated from the user-supplied key

# Structure of the DES

- Input is first permuted, then split into left half (L) and right half (R), each 32 bits
- Round begins; R and round key run through function  $f$ , then xor'ed with L
  - $f$  expands R to 48 bits, xors with round key, and then each 6 bits of this are run through S-boxes (substitution boxes), each of which gives 4 bits of output
  - Those 32 bits are permuted and this is the output of  $f$
- R and L swapped, ending the round
  - Swapping does not occur in the last round
- After last round, L and R combined, permuted, forming DES output

# Controversy

- Considered too weak
  - Diffie, Hellman said in a few years technology would allow DES to be broken in days
    - Design using 1999 technology published
- Design decisions not public
  - S-boxes may have backdoors

# Undesirable Properties

- 4 weak keys
  - They are their own inverses
- 12 semi-weak keys
  - Each has another semi-weak key as inverse
- Complementation property
  - $DES_k(m) = c \Rightarrow DES_k(\bar{m}) = \bar{c}$
- S-boxes exhibit irregular properties
  - Distribution of odd, even numbers non-random
  - Outputs of fourth box depends on input to third box

# Differential Cryptanalysis

- A chosen ciphertext attack
  - Requires  $2^{47}$  plaintext, ciphertext pairs
- Revealed several properties
  - Small changes in S-boxes reduced the number of pairs needed
  - Making every bit of the round keys independent did not impede attack
- Linear cryptanalysis improves result
  - Requires  $2^{43}$  plaintext, ciphertext pairs



# DES Modes

- Electronic Code Book Mode (ECB)
  - Encipher each block independently
- Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
  - Xor each block with previous ciphertext block
  - Requires an initialization vector for the first one
- Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt (2 keys:  $k, k'$ )
  - $c = \text{DES}_k(\text{DES}_{k'}^{-1}(\text{DES}_k(m)))$
- Triple DES(3 keys:  $k, k', k''$ )
  - $c = \text{DES}_k(\text{DES}_{k'}(\text{DES}_{k''}(m)))$

# Current Status of DES

- Design for computer system, associated software that could break any DES-enciphered message in a few days published in 1998
- Several challenges to break DES messages solved using distributed computing
- NIST selected Rijndael as Advanced Encryption Standard, successor to DES
  - Designed to withstand attacks that were successful on DES
- DES officially withdrawn in 2005

# Advanced Encryption Standard

- Competition announces in 1997 to select successor to DES
  - Successor needed to be available for use without payment (no royalties, etc.)
  - Successor must encipher 128-bit blocks with keys of lengths 128, 192, and 256
- 3 workshops in which proposed successors were presented, analyzed
- Rijndael selected as successor to DES, called the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
  - Other finalists were Twofish, Serpent, RC6, MARS

# Overview of the AES

- A block cipher:
  - encrypts blocks of 128 bits using a 128, 192, or 256 bit key
  - outputs 128 bits of ciphertext
- A product cipher
  - basic unit is the bit
  - performs both substitution and transposition (permutation) on the bits
- Cipher consists of rounds (iterations) each with a round key generated from the user-supplied key
  - If 128 bit key, then 10 rounds
  - If 192 bit key, then 12 rounds
  - If 256 bit key, then 14 rounds

# Structure of the AES: Encryption

- Input placed into a state array, which is then combined with zeroth round key
  - Treat state array as a 4x4 matrix, each entry being a byte
- Round begins; new values substituted for each byte of the state array
- Rows then cyclically shifted
- Each column independently altered
  - Not done in last round
- Result xor'ed with round key
- After last round, state array is the encrypted input

# Structure of the AES: Decryption

- Round key schedule reversed
- Input placed into a state array, which is then combined with zeroth round key (of reversed schedule)
- Round begins; rows cyclically shifted, then new values substituted for each byte of the state array
  - Inverse rotation, substitution of encryption
- Result xor'ed with round key (of reversed schedule)
- Each column independently altered
  - Inverse of encryption; this is not done in last round
- After last round, state array is the decrypted input

# Analysis of AES

- Designed to withstand attacks that the DES is vulnerable to
- All details of design made public, unlike with the DES
  - In particular, those of the substitutions (S-boxes) were described
- After 2 successive rounds, every bit in the state array depends on every bit in the state array 2 rounds ago
- No weak, semi-weak keys

# AES Modes

- DES modes also work with AES
- EDE and “Triple-AES” not used
  - Extended block size makes this unnecessary
- New counter mode CTR added