

Outline for April 5, 2005

1. Principles of Secure Design
 - a. Refer to both designing secure systems and securing existing systems
 - b. Speaks to limiting damage
2. Principle of Least Privilege
 - a. Give process only those privileges it needs
 - b. Examples in programming (making things setuid to root unnecessarily, limiting protection domain; modularity, robust programming)
 - c. Example attacks (misuse of privileges, etc.)
3. Principle of Fail-Safe Defaults
 - a. Default is to deny
 - b. Example of violation: *su* program
4. Principle of Economy of Mechanism
 - a. KISS principle
 - b. Enables quick, easy verification
 - c. Example of complexity: *sendmail*
5. Principle of Complete Mediation
 - a. All accesses must be checked
 - b. Forces system-wide view of controls
 - c. Sources of requests must be identified correctly
 - d. Source of problems: caching (because it may not reflect the state of the system correctly); examples are race conditions, DNS poisoning
6. Principle of Open Design
 - a. Designs are open so everyone can examine them and know the limits of the security provided
 - b. Does *not* apply to cryptographic keys
 - c. Acceptance of reality: they can get this info anyway
7. Principle of Separation of Privilege
 - a. Require multiple conditions to be satisfied before granting permission/access/etc.
 - b. Advantage: 2 accidents/errors/etc. must happen together to trigger failure
8. Principle of Least Common Mechanism
 - a. Minimize sharing
 - b. New service: in kernel or as a library routine? Latter is better, as each user gets their own copy
9. Principle of Psychological Acceptability
 - a. Willingness to use the mechanisms
 - b. Understanding model
 - c. Matching user's goal
10. ACM and primitive operations
 - a. Go over subjects, objects (includes subjects), and state (S, O, A) where A is ACM
 - b. Transitions modify ACM entries; primitive operations
 - i. **enter** r **into** $A[s, o]$
 - ii. **delete** r **from** $A[s, o]$
 - iii. **create subject** s' (note $A[s', x] = A[x, s'] = \emptyset$ for all x)
 - iv. **create object** o' (note $A[x, o'] = \emptyset$ for all x)
 - v. **destroy subject** s'
 - vi. **destroy object** o'
11. Commands
 - a. **command** $c(s_1, \dots, s_k, o_1, \dots, o_k)$
if r_1 **in** $A[s_1, o_1]$ **and**

- ```
r2 in A[s2, o2] and
...
rm in A[sm, om]
then
 op1;
 op2;
 ...;
 opn;
end.
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- b. Example 1: creating a file  
**command** *create\_file*(*p*, *f*)  
 **create object** *f*;  
 **enter** *Own* **into** *A*[*p*, *f*]  
 **enter** *Read* **into** *A*[*p*, *f*]  
 **enter** *Write* **into** *A*[*p*, *f*]  
**end.**
- c. Example 2: granting one process read rights to a file  
**command** *grant\_read*(*p*, *q*, *f*)  
**if** *Own* **in** *A*[*p*, *f*]  
**then**  
 **enter** *Read* **into** *A*[*q*, *f*]  
**end.**