Lecture 10 October 18, 2023

Kerberos

- Authentication system
 - Based on Needham-Schroeder with Denning-Sacco modification
 - Central server plays role of trusted third party ("Cathy")
- Ticket
 - Issuer vouches for identity of requester of service
- Authenticator
 - Identifies sender

Idea

- User *u* authenticates to Kerberos server
 - Obtains ticket $T_{u,TGS}$ for ticket granting service (TGS)
- User *u* wants to use service *s*:
 - User sends authenticator A_u , ticket $T_{u,TGS}$ to TGS asking for ticket for service
 - TGS sends ticket $T_{u,s}$ to user
 - User sends A_{u} , $T_{u,s}$ to server as request to use s
- Details follow

Ticket

- Credential saying issuer has identified ticket requester
- Example ticket issued to user *u* for service *s*

 $T_{u,s} = s \mid \mid \{ u \mid \mid u's \text{ address } \mid \mid valid \text{ time } \mid \mid k_{u,s} \} k_s$

where:

- $k_{u,s}$ is session key for user and service
- Valid time is interval for which ticket valid
- *u*'s address may be IP address or something else
 - Note: more fields, but not relevant here


Authenticator

- Credential containing identity of sender of ticket
 - Used to confirm sender is entity to which ticket was issued
- Example: authenticator user *u* generates for service *s* $A_{u,s} = \{ u \mid | \text{ generation time } | | k_t \} k_{u,s}$

where:

- k_t is alternate session key
- Generation time is when authenticator generated
 - Note: more fields, not relevant here

Protocol



Analysis

- First two steps get user ticket to use TGS
 - User *u* can obtain session key only if *u* knows key shared with AS
- Next four steps show how *u* gets and uses ticket for service *s*
 - Service s validates request by checking sender (using A_{u,s}) is same as entity ticket issued to
 - Step 6 optional; used when *u* requests confirmation

Problems

- Relies on synchronized clocks
 - If not synchronized and old tickets, authenticators not cached, replay is possible
- Tickets have some fixed fields
 - Dictionary attacks possible
 - Kerberos 4 session keys weak (had much less than 56 bits of randomness); researchers at Purdue found them from tickets in minutes

Public Key Key Exchange

- Here interchange keys known
 - e_A , e_B Alice and Bob's public keys known to all
 - d_A , d_B Alice and Bob's private keys known only to owner
- Simple protocol
 - k_s is desired session key

Alice
$$\{k_s\}e_B$$
 \rightarrow Bob

Problem and Solution


- Vulnerable to forgery or replay
 - Because e_B known to anyone, Bob has no assurance that Alice sent message
- Simple fix uses Alice's private key
 - *k_s* is desired session key

Alice
$$\{\{k_s\}d_A\}e_B$$
 \longrightarrow Bob

Notes

- Can include message enciphered with k_s
- Assumes Bob has Alice's public key, and vice versa
 - If not, each must get it from public server
 - If keys not bound to identity of owner, attacker Eve can launch a *man-in-the-middle* attack (next slide; Cathy is public server providing public keys)
 - Solution to this (binding identity to keys) discussed later as public key infrastructure (PKI)

Man-in-the-Middle Attack



Diffie-Hellman

- Compute a common, shared key
 - Called a *symmetric key exchange protocol*
- Based on discrete logarithm problem
 - Given integers *n*, *g* and prime number *p*, compute *k* such that *n* = *g^k* mod *p*
 - Solutions known for small p
 - Solutions computationally infeasible as *p* grows large

Algorithm

- Constants: prime p, integer $g \neq 0, 1, p-1$
 - Known to all participants
- Alice chooses private key k_{Alice} , computes public key $K_{Alice} = g^{k_{Alice}} \mod p$
- Bob chooses private key k_{Bob} , computes public key $K_{Bob} = g^{k_{Bob}} \mod p$
- To communicate with Bob, Alice computes $K_{Alice,Bob} = K_{Bob}^{k_{Alice}} \mod p$
- To communicate with Alice, Bob computes $K_{Bob,Alice} = K_{Alice} k_{Bob} \mod p$
- It can be shown $K_{Alice,Bob} = K_{Bob,Alice}$

Example

- Assume *p* = 121001 and *g* = 6981
- Alice chooses $k_{Alice} = 526784$
 - Then $K_{Alice} = 6981^{26874} \mod 121001 = 22258$
- Bob chooses $k_{Bob} = 5596$
 - Then $K_{Bob} = 6981^{5596} \mod 121001 = 112706$
- Shared key:
 - $K_{\text{Bob}}^{k_{\text{Alice}}} \mod p = 112706^{26874} \mod 121001 = 78618$
 - $K_{\text{Alice}} \stackrel{k_{Bob}}{\mod} p = 22258^{5596} \mod 121001 = 78618$

Problems

- Using cipher requires knowledge of environment, and threats in the environment, in which cipher will be used
 - Is the set of possible messages small?
 - Can an active wiretapper rearrange or change parts of the message?
 - Do the messages exhibit regularities that remain after encipherment?
 - Can the components of the message be misinterpreted?

Attack #1: Precomputation

- Set of possible messages *M* small
- Public key cipher *f* used
- Idea: precompute set of possible ciphertexts *f*(*M*), build table (*m*, *f*(*m*))
- When ciphertext *f*(*m*) appears, use table to find *m*
- Also called *forward searches*

Example

- Cathy knows Alice will send Bob one of two messages: enciphered BUY, or enciphered SELL
- Using public key e_{Bob} , Cathy precomputes

$$m_1 = \{ BUY \} e_{Bob}, m_2 = \{ SELL \} e_{Bob}$$

- Cathy sees Alice send Bob m₂
- Cathy knows Alice sent SELL

May Not Be Obvious


- Digitized sound
 - Seems like far too many possible plaintexts, as initial calculations suggest 2³² such plaintexts
 - Analysis of redundancy in human speech reduced this to about 100,000 (≈ 2¹⁷), small enough for precomputation attacks

Misordered Blocks

- Alice sends Bob message
 - $n_{Bob} = 262631, e_{Bob} = 45539, d_{Bob} = 235457$
- Message is TOMNOTANN (191412 131419 001313)
- Enciphered message is 193459 029062 081227
- Eve intercepts it, rearranges blocks
 - Now enciphered message is 081227 029062 193459
- Bob gets enciphered message, deciphers it
 - He sees ANNNOTTOM, opposite of what Alice sent

Statistical Regularities

- If plaintext repeats, ciphertext may too
- Example using AES-128:
 - Input image: Hello world!
 - corresponding output image:



- Note you can still make out the words
- Fix: cascade blocks together (chaining); more details later

Type Flaw Attacks

- Assume components of messages in protocol have particular meaning
- Example: Otway-Rees:

The Attack

- Ichabod intercepts message from Bob to Cathy in step 2
- Ichabod *replays* this message, sending it to Bob
 - Slight modification: he deletes the cleartext names
- Bob expects $n \mid \mid \{r_1 \mid \mid k_s\} k_A \mid \mid \{r_2 \mid \mid k_s\} k_B$
- Bob gets n || { r₁ || n || Alice || Bob } k_A || { r₂ || n || Alice || Bob } k_B
- So Bob sees n || Alice || Bob as the session key and Ichabod knows this
- When Alice gets her part, she makes the same assumption
- Now Ichabod can read their encrypted traffic

Solution


- Tag components of cryptographic messages with information about what the component is
 - But the tags themselves may be confused with data ...

What These Mean

- Use of strong cryptosystems, well-chosen (or random) keys not enough to be secure
- Other factors:
 - Protocols directing use of cryptosystems
 - Ancillary information added by protocols
 - Implementation (not discussed here)
 - Maintenance and operation (not discussed here)

Networks and Cryptography

- ISO/OSI model
- Conceptually, each host communicates with peer at each layer



Link and End-to-End Protocols

Link Protocol

End-to-End (or E2E) Protocol



Encryption

- Link encryption
 - Each host enciphers message so host at "next hop" can read it
 - Message can be read at intermediate hosts
- End-to-end encryption
 - Host enciphers message so host at other end of communication can read it
 - Message cannot be read at intermediate hosts

Examples

- SSH protocol
 - Messages between client, server are enciphered, and encipherment, decipherment occur only at these hosts
 - End-to-end protocol
- PPP Encryption Control Protocol
 - Host gets message, deciphers it
 - Figures out where to forward it
 - Enciphers it in appropriate key and forwards it
 - Link protocol

Cryptographic Considerations

• Link encryption

- Each host shares key with neighbor
- Can be set on per-host or per-host-pair basis
 - Windsor, stripe, seaview each have own keys
 - One key for (windsor, stripe); one for (stripe, seaview); one for (windsor, seaview)
- End-to-end
 - Each host shares key with destination
 - Can be set on per-host or per-host-pair basis
 - Message cannot be read at intermediate nodes

Traffic Analysis

- Link encryption
 - Can protect headers of packets
 - Possible to hide source and destination
 - Note: may be able to deduce this from traffic flows
- End-to-end encryption
 - Cannot hide packet headers
 - Intermediate nodes need to route packet
 - Attacker can read source, destination