Outline for October 27, 2023

Reading: *text*, §16.2–16.5,17

Assignments: Homework 3, due November 6; Background Research, due November 3 (*note extension*)

- 1. Access Control Lists
 - (a) Full access control lists
 - (b) Issues in the way lists work
 - (c) Revocation issue
- 2. Capabilities
 - (a) Capability-based addressing
 - (b) Capabilities as security mechanisms
 - (c) Inheritance of C-Lists
- 3. MULTICS ring mechanism
 - (a) Rings, gates, ring-crossing faults
 - (b) Used for both data and procedures; rights are REWA

 (b_1, b_2) access bracket—can access freely; (b_3, b_4) call bracket—can call segment through gate; so if *a*'s access bracket is (32, 35) and its call bracket is (35, 39), then assuming permission mode (REWA) allows access, a procedure in:

rings 0–31: can access *a*, but ring-crossing fault occurs

- rings 32–35: can access a, no ring-crossing fault
- rings 36–39: can access a, provided a valid gate is used as an entry point
- rings 40–63: cannot access a
- (c) If the procedure is accessing a data segment *d*, no call bracket allowed; given the above, assuming permission mode (REWA) allows access, a procedure in: rings 0–32: can access *d*rings 33–35: can access *d*, but cannot write to it (W or A) rings 36–63: cannot access *d*
- 4. Lock and Key
 - (a) Associate with each object a lock; associate with each process that has access to object a key (it's a cross between ACLs and C-Lists)
 - (b) Example: cryptographic (Gifford). *X* object enciphered with key *K*. Associate an opener *R* with *X*. Then: **OR-Access**: *K* can be recovered with any D_i in a list of *n* deciphering transformations, so $R = (E_1(K), E_2(K), \dots, E_n(K))$ and any process with access to any of the D_i 's can access the file **AND-Access**: need all *n* deciphering functions to get *K*: $R = E_1(E_2(\dots E_n(K) \dots))$