

ECS 235B Module 23

Trust Models

Trust Models

- Integrity models state conditions under which changes preserve a set of properties
 - So deal with the *preservation* of trustworthiness
- Trust models deal with confidence one can have in the initial values or settings
 - So deal with the *initial* evaluation of whether data can be trusted

Definition of Trust

A trusts B if *A* believes, with a level of subjective probability, that *B* will perform a particular action, both before the action can be monitored (or independently of the capacity of being able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects *Anna's* own action.

- Includes subjective nature of trust
- Captures idea that trust comes from a belief in what we do not monitor
- Leads to transitivity of trust

Transitivity of Trust

Transitivity of trust: if A trusts B and B trusts C, then A trusts C

- Not always; depends on A's assessment of B's judgment
- *Conditional transitivity of trust:* A trusts C when
 - B recommends C to A;
 - A trusts B's recommendations;
 - A can make judgments about B's recommendations; and
 - Based on B's recommendation, A may trust C less than B does
- *Direct trust:* A trusts C because of A's observations and interactions
- *Indirect trust:* A trusts C because A accepts B's recommendation

Types of Beliefs Underlying Trust

- *Competence*: A believes B competent to aid A in reaching goal
- *Disposition*: A believes B will actually do what A needs to reach goal
- *Dependence*: A believes she needs what B will do, depends on what B will do, or it's better to rely on B than not
- *Fulfillment*: A believes goal will be reached
- *Willingness*: A believes B has decided to do what A wants

Evaluating Arguments about Trust (*con't*)

- *Persistence*: A believes B will not change B's mind before doing what A wants
- *Self-confidence*: A believes that B knows B can take the action A wants
- *Majority behavior*: A's belief that most people from B's community are trustworthy
- *Prudence*: Not trusting B poses unacceptable risk to A
- *Pragmatism*: A's current interests best served by trusting B

Trust Management

- Use a language to express relationships about trust, allowing us to reason about trust
 - Evaluation mechanisms take data, trust relationships and provide a measure of trust about the entity or whether an action should or should not be taken
- Two basic forms
 - Policy-based trust management
 - Reputation-based trust management

Policy-Based Trust Management

- Credentials instantiate policy rules
 - Credentials are data, so they too may be input to the rules
 - Trusted third parties often vouch for credentials
- Policy rules expressed in a policy language
 - Different languages for different goals
 - Expressiveness of language determines the policies it can express

Example: Keynote

- Basic units
 - Assertions: describe actions allowed to possessors of credentials
 - Policy: statements about policy
 - Credential: statements about credentials
 - Action environment: attributes describing action associated with credentials
- Evaluator: takes set of policy assertions, set of credentials, action environment and determines if proposed action is consistent with policy

Example

- Consider email domain: policy assertion authorizes holder of mastercred for all actions:

```
Authorizer: "POLICY"  
Licensees: "mastercred"
```

- Credential assertion:

```
KeyNote-Version: 2  
Local-Constants: Alice="cred1234", Bob="credABCD"  
Authorizer: "authcred"  
Licensees: Alice || Bob  
Conditions: (app_domain == "RFC822-EMAIL") &&  
             (address ~="^.*@keynote\\.ucdavis\\.edu$")  
Signature: "signed"
```

- Compliance Value Set: { "_MIN_TRUST", "_MAX_TRUST" }

Example: Results

- Evaluator given action environment:

```
_ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "Alice"  
app_domain = "RFC822-EMAIL"  
address = "snoopy@keynote.ucdavis.edu"
```

it satisfies policy, so returns `_MAX_TRUST`

- Evaluator given action environment:

```
_ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "Bob"  
app_domain = "RFC822-EMAIL"  
address = "opus@admin.ucdavis.edu"
```

it does not satisfy policy, so returns `_MIN_TRUST`

Example 2

- Consider separation of duty: policy assertion delegates authority to pay invoices to entity with credential “fundmgrcred”:
Authorizer: "POLICY"
Licensee: "fundmgtcred"
Conditions: (app_domain == "INVOICE" && @dollars < 10000)
- Credential assertion (requires 2 signatures on any expenditure):
KeyNote-Version: 2
Comment: This credential specifies a spending policy
Authorizer: "authcred"
Licensees: 2-of("cred1", "cred2", "cred3", "cred4", "cred5")
Conditions: (app_domain=="INVOICE") # note nested clauses
 -> { (@dollars) < 2500) -> "Approve";
 (@dollars < 7500) -> "ApproveAndLog"; };
Signature: "signed"
- Compliance Value Set: {"Reject", "ApproveAndLog", "Approve" }

Example 2: Results

- Evaluator given action environment:

```
_ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "cred1,cred4"  
app_domain = "INVOICE"  
dollars = "1000"
```

it satisfies first clause of condition, and so policy, so returns **Approve**

- Evaluator given action environment:

```
_ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "cred1"  
app_domain = "INVOICE"  
dollars = "1500"
```

it does not satisfy policy as too few Licensees, so returns **Reject**

Example 2: Results

- Evaluator given action environment:

```
_ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "cred1,cred2"  
app_domain = "INVOICE"  
dollars = "3541"
```

it satisfies second clause of condition, and so policy, so returns `ApproveAndLog`

- Evaluator given action environment:

```
_ACTION_AUTHORIZERS = "cred1,cred5"  
app_domain = "INVOICE"  
dollars = "8000"
```

it does not satisfy policy as amount too large, so returns `Reject`

Reputation-Based Trust Management

- Use past behavior, information from other sources, to determine whether to trust an entity
- Some models distinguish between direct, indirect trust
- Trust category, trust values, agent's identification form *reputation*
- *Recommendation* is trust information containing at least 1 reputation
- Systems use many different types of metrics
 - Statistical models
 - Belief models (probabilities may not sum to 1, due to uncertainty in belief)
 - Fuzzy models (reasoning involves degrees of trustworthiness)

Example 1

- Direct trust: -1 (untrustworthy), 1 to 4 (degrees of trust, increasing), 0 (cannot make trust judgment)
- Indirect trust: -1 , 0 (same as for direct trust), 1 to 4 (how close the judgment of recommender is to the entity being recommended to)
- Formula:

$$t(T, P) = tv(T) \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{tv(R_i)}{4}$$

where T is entity of concern, P trust path, $tv(x)$ trust value of x , $t(T, P)$ overall trust in T based on trust path P

Example 1

- Amy wants Boris' recommendation about Danny so she asks him
 - Amy trusts Boris' recommendations with trust value 2 as his judgment is somewhat close to hers
- Boris doesn't know Danny, so he asks Carole
 - He trusts her recommendations with trust value 3
- Carole believes Danny is above average programmer, so she replies with a recommendation of 3
- Boris adds this to the end of the recommendation
- P is Amy—Boris—Carole—Danny, so $R_1 = \text{Boris}$, $R_2 = \text{Carole}$, $T = \text{Danny}$, so

$$T(\text{"Danny"}, P) = 3 \times \frac{2}{4} \times \frac{3}{4} = 1.125$$

Example 2

- PeerTrust uses metric based on complaints
- $u \in P$ is a node in a peer-to-peer network
- $p(u, t) \in P$ is node that u interacts with in transaction t
- $S(u, t)$ is amount of satisfaction u gets from $p(u, t)$
- $I(u)$ is total number of transactions
- Trust value of u : $T(u) = \sum_{t=1}^{I(u)} S(u, t)Cr(p(u, t))$
- Credibility of node x 's feedback: $Cr(x) = \sum_{t=1}^{I(x)} S(x, t) \frac{T(p(x, t))}{\sum_{y=1}^{I(x)} T(p(x, y))}$
- So credibility of x depends on prior trust values

Key Points

- Integrity policies deal with trust
 - As trust is hard to quantify, these policies are hard to evaluate completely
 - Look for assumptions and trusted users to find possible weak points in their implementation
- Biba based on multilevel integrity
- Clark-Wilson focuses on separation of duty and transactions

Quiz

Do systems instantiating policy-based trust models ever rely on a reputation-based trust model?

1. No, the two are completely independent
2. Yes; if credentials are assigned, they are often assigned based on the reputation of the subject of the credential
3. It's the other way around; reputation-based trust models rely on policy-based trust models to define the formulae that compute the degree of trust