ECS 235B Module 26
Implementation Assurance Techniques
Implementation Considerations for Assurance

• Make system modular, with minimum of interfaces
  • Interfaces are well-designed
  • Remove any non-security functionality from them, whenever possible

• Choice of programming language can affect assurance
  • Use one providing built-in features to avoid common flaws
    • Strong typing, built-in checks for buffer overflow, data hiding, error handling, etc.
  • Otherwise, develop and use appropriate coding standards and guidelines
    • Useful, but limited support for good code
Implementation Management

• *Configuration management*: control of changes made in system’s components, documentation, and testing throughout development, operational life

• Need processes, tools to do this effectively

• Configuration management system consists of:
  • Version control and tracking
  • Change authorization: restrict change check in to authorized people
  • Integration procedures
  • Product generation tools: generate the distribution version from authorized version
Justification

• Goal is to demonstrate implementation meets design
• Security testing
• Formal methods: used during coding processes, work best on small parts of a program performing well-defined tasks
  • We’ll discuss these later (next chapter)
Testing

• Testing techniques
  • *Functional* (*black box*): testing to see how well entity meets its specifications
  • *Structural* (*white box*): testing based on analysis of code to develop test cases

• When to do testing
  • *Unit testing*: testing by developer on code module before integration
    • Usually structural testing
  • *System testing*: functional testing performed by integration team on integrated modules
    • May include structural testing
  • *Third-party (independent)* testing: functional testing by a group outside development organization
Security Testing

• Testing that addresses product security
  • *Security functional testing*: functional testing specific to security issues described in relevant specification
    • Focus is on pathological cases, boundary value issues, and so forth
  • *Security structural testing*: structural testing specific to security implementation found in relevant code
  • *Security requirements testing*: security functional testing specific to security requirements found in requirements specification
    • May overlap significantly with security functional testing

• Test coverage covers system security functions more consistently than ordinary testing
  • When completed, provides rigorous argument that all external interfaces have been completely tested
Security Testing

• Usually takes place at external interface level
  • Here, “interface” is point at which processing crosses security perimeter
  • Users access system through these
  • Therefore, violations of policy occur through these

• Parallel efforts, one by programming team, other by test team

• Security test suites very large
  • Automated test suites essential
Code Development and Testing

- Code
  - Unit test
    - Integrate
      - Build system
  - Find code bugs
    - Build system
  - Execute system test on current build

- Code
  - Test unit on current build
    - Integrate tested test into automated test suite
    - Build test suite
  - Find test bugs
    - Build test suite
Plans and Reports

- Configuration management, documentation very important
  - Testers develop, document test plans, test specifications, test procedures, test results
- Writing test plans, specifications, procedures help authors examine, correct approaches
  - Provides assurance about test methodology
  - Enables analysis of test suite for correctness, completeness
- Reports identify which tests entity has passed, which it has failed
  - Watch out for failures due to automation (where automated test fails, but same test run independently of suite passes)
Security Testing Using PGWG

• PAT(Process Action Team) Guidance Working Group developed systematic approach to test development using successive decomposition of system, requirements tracing

• Methodology works well in system defined into successively smaller components
  • Requirements mapped to successively lower levels of design using *test matrices*
  • At lowest level, *test assertions* claim interfaces meet each requirement
  • Used to develop test cases
  • Includes documentation approach
PGWG Test Matrices

• Two types of test matrices: high-level, low-level

• High level matrix
  • Rows are entity subsystems, major components
  • Columns are high-level security areas focused on functional requirements
    • Like access controls, integrity controls, cryptography
    • Cells give pointers to relevant documentation, lower-level test matrices

• Low level matrix
  • Rows are interfaces to subsystem, component
  • Columns represent security areas, their subdivisions, individual requirements
  • Cells contain test assertions, each of which apply to single interface and requirement
    • Any empty cells must be justified to show why requirement does not apply
Example: Testing Security-Enhanced UNIX

- System includes file, memory, process, and IPC management, process control, I/O interfaces and devices
- Security functional requirement areas
  - Discretionary access control
  - Privileges, identification, authentication (I&A)
  - Object reuse protection
  - Security audit
  - System architecture constraints
- Testing uses interpretation of PGWG methodology
  - High-level matrix
  - Low-level matrices, 1 for each row of high-level matrix
Example: High-Level Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Requirement Area</th>
<th>Component</th>
<th>DAC</th>
<th>Priv</th>
<th>I&amp;A</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>Audit</th>
<th>Arch</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process management</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process control</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>File management</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Audit subsystem</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/O subsystem interfaces</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I/O device drivers</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IPC management</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memory management</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Example: Low-Level Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System Call</th>
<th>DAC u/g/o</th>
<th>DAC ACL</th>
<th>Priv</th>
<th>I&amp;A</th>
<th>OR</th>
<th>Security Audit</th>
<th>Logging</th>
<th>Isolation</th>
<th>Protection Domains</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$brk$</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$madvise$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$mmap$</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$mprotect$</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$msync$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$munmap$</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$plock$</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$vm-ctl$</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Test Assertions

• Created by identifying security-relevant, testable, analyzable conditions
  • Review design documentation for this

• PGWG methods for stating assertions
  • Develop statements describing behavior that must be verified
    • Example: “Verify that the calling process needs DAC write access permission to the parent directory of the file being created. Verify that if access is denied, the return error code is 2.”
  • Develop statements that tester must prove or disprove with tests
    • Example: “The calling process needs DAC write access permission to the parent directory of the file being created, and if access is denied, it returns error code 2.”
  • State assertions as claims embedded within structured specification format
Test Specifications

• Test cases to verify truth of each assertion for each interface

• PGWG suggests:
  • High-level test specifications (HLTS) describe, specify test cases for each interface
  • Low-level test specifications (LLTS) provide information about each test case
  • Like setup and cleanup conditions, other environmental conditions
Example: HLTS for Interface \textit{stime()}

High-level test specification includes assertion, test case specifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assertion Number</th>
<th>Requirement Area and Number</th>
<th>Assertion</th>
<th>Relevant Test Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>PRIV AC_1</td>
<td>Verify that only root can use system call \textit{stime()} successfully</td>
<td>Stime_1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>PRIV AC_2</td>
<td>Verify audit record generated for every failed \textit{stime()} call</td>
<td>Stime_1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>PRIV AC_3</td>
<td>Verify audit record generated for every successful \textit{stime()} call</td>
<td>Stime_1, 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Test Case Specifications

• Describe specific tests required to meet assertions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test Case Name and Number</th>
<th>Is UserID = root?</th>
<th>Expected Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stime_1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Call to <code>stime()</code> should succeed; audit record should be generated noting successful attempt and new clock time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stime_2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Call to <code>stime()</code> should fail; audit record should be generated noting failed attempt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LLTS for Stime_1

Test case name: K_MIS_stime_1

Test case description: Call stime as a non-root user to change system time; this should fail, verifying only root can use this call successfully

Expected result: stime call should fail with return value of –1, system clock should be unchanged, error number (errno) set to EPERM, audit record as shown below

Test specific setup:
1. Log in as a non-root user (secusr1)
2. Get the current system time
LLTS for Stime_1 (con’t)

**Algorithm:**

1. Do the setup as above
2. Call *stime* to change system time to 10 min ahead of current time
3. If return value is −1, error number is **EPERM**, and current system time not new time given to *stime*, declare the test passed; otherwise, declare failed

*Cleanup:* If system time has changed, reduce current time to 10 minutes
LLTS for Stime_1 (con’t)

Audit record field values for failure (success):

- **Authid**: secusr1
- **RUID**: secusr1
- **EUID**: secusr1
- **RGID**: scgrp1
- **EGID**: scgrp1
- **Class**: tune
- **Reason**: Privilege failure (success)
- **Event**: SETTHETIME_1
- **Message**: Privilege failure (none)
Operation, Maintenance Assurance

• Bugs will be found during operation, requiring fixes
  • *Hot fix*: handle bugs immediately, sent out as quickly as possible
    • Used to fix bugs that immediately affect system security or operation
  • *Regular fix*: handle less serious bugs or give long-term solutions to bugs fixed by hot fix, usually collected until some condition arises and then sent out
    • Sent out as maintenance release or as “patch Tuesday” or some other way

• Well-defined procedures handle, track reported flaws
  • Include information about bug, such as description, remedial actions, severity, pointer to related configuration management entries, other documentation
  • Actions taken follow same security procedures used during original development