

ECS 235B Module 27

Integrity Requirements and the Biba Model

Requirements of Policies

1. Users will not write their own programs, but will use existing production programs and databases.
2. Programmers will develop and test programs on a non-production system; if they need access to actual data, they will be given production data via a special process, but will use it on their development system.
3. A special process must be followed to install a program from the development system onto the production system.
4. The special process in requirement 3 must be controlled and audited.
5. The managers and auditors must have access to both the system state and the system logs that are generated.

Principles of Operation

- *Separation of duty*: if two or more steps are required to perform a critical function, at least two different people should perform the steps
- *Separation of function*: different entities should perform different functions
- *Auditing*: recording enough information to ensure the abilities to both recover and determine accountability

Biba Integrity Model

Basis for all 3 models:

- Set of subjects S , objects O , integrity levels I , relation $\leq \subseteq I \times I$ holding when second dominates first
- $min: I \times I \rightarrow I$ returns lesser of integrity levels
- $i: S \cup O \rightarrow I$ gives integrity level of entity
- $\underline{r}: S \times O$ means $s \in S$ can read $o \in O$
- $\underline{w}, \underline{x}$ defined similarly

Intuition for Integrity Levels

- The higher the level, the more confidence
 - That a program will execute correctly
 - That data is accurate and/or reliable
- Note relationship between integrity and trustworthiness
- Important point: *integrity levels are **not** security levels*

Information Transfer Path

- An *information transfer path* is a sequence of objects o_1, \dots, o_{n+1} and corresponding sequence of subjects s_1, \dots, s_n such that $s_i \underline{r} o_i$ and $s_i \underline{w} o_{i+1}$ for all $i, 1 \leq i \leq n$.
- Idea: information can flow from o_1 to o_{n+1} along this path by successive reads and writes

Low-Water-Mark Policy

- Idea: when s reads o , $i(s) = \min(i(s), i(o))$; s can only write objects at lower levels
- Rules
 1. $s \in S$ can write to $o \in O$ if and only if $i(o) \leq i(s)$.
 2. If $s \in S$ reads $o \in O$, then $i'(s) = \min(i(s), i(o))$, where $i'(s)$ is the subject's integrity level after the read.
 3. $s_1 \in S$ can execute $s_2 \in S$ if and only if $i(s_2) \leq i(s_1)$.

Information Flow and Model

- If information transfer path from $o_1 \in O$ to $o_{n+1} \in O$, enforcement of low-water-mark policy requires $i(o_{n+1}) \leq i(o_1)$ for all $n > 1$.
 - Idea of proof: Assume information transfer path exists between o_1 and o_{n+1} . Assume that each read and write was performed in the order of the indices of the vertices. By induction, the integrity level for each subject is the minimum of the integrity levels for all objects preceding it in path, so $i(s_n) \leq i(o_1)$. As n th write succeeds, $i(o_{n+1}) \leq i(s_n)$. Hence $i(o_{n+1}) \leq i(o_1)$.

Problems

- Subjects' integrity levels do not increase as system runs
 - Soon no subject will be able to access objects at high integrity levels
- Alternative: change object levels rather than subject levels
 - Soon all objects will be at the lowest integrity level
- Crux of problem is model prevents indirect modification
 - Because subject levels lowered when subject reads from low-integrity object

Ring Policy

- Idea: subject integrity levels static
- Rules
 1. $s \in S$ can write to $o \in O$ if and only if $i(o) \leq i(s)$.
 2. Any subject can read any object.
 3. $s_1 \in S$ can execute $s_2 \in S$ if and only if $i(s_2) \leq i(s_1)$.
- Difference with low-water-mark policy is any subject can read any object
- Eliminates indirect modification problem
- Same information flow result holds

Strict Integrity Policy

- Dual of Bell-LaPadula model
 1. $s \in S$ can read $o \in O$ iff $i(s) \leq i(o)$
 2. $s \in S$ can write to $o \in O$ iff $i(o) \leq i(s)$
 3. $s_1 \in S$ can execute $s_2 \in S$ iff $i(s_2) \leq i(s_1)$
- Add compartments and discretionary controls to get full dual of Bell-LaPadula model
- Information flow result holds
 - Different proof, though
- Term “Biba Model” refers to this

LOCUS and Biba

- Goal: prevent untrusted software from altering data or other software
- Approach: make levels of trust explicit
 - *credibility rating* based on estimate of software's trustworthiness (0 untrusted, n highly trusted)
 - *trusted file systems* contain software with a single credibility level
 - Process has *risk level* or highest credibility level at which process can execute
 - Must use *run-untrusted* command to run software at lower credibility level

Quiz

How does the Biba model differ from the Bell-LaPadula model?

1. The Bell-LaPadula model deals with information flow, and the Biba model does not.
2. The Bell-LaPadula model has categories and the Biba model does not.
3. In the Bell-LaPadula model, a subject cannot “write up” to an object, whereas in the Biba model the subject can.
4. In the Bell-LaPadula model, a subject cannot “read up” to an object, whereas in the Biba model it can.