ECS 235B Module 36 Role-Based Access Control

Role-Based Access Control

- Access depends on function, not identity
 - Example:
 - Allison, bookkeeper for Math Dept, has access to financial records.
 - She leaves.
 - Betty hired as the new bookkeeper, so she now has access to those records
 - The role of "bookkeeper" dictates access, not the identity of the individual.

Definitions

- Role *r*: collection of job functions
 - *trans*(*r*): set of authorized transactions for *r*
- Active role of subject s: role s is currently in
 - *actr(s*)
- Authorized roles of a subject *s*: set of roles *s* is authorized to assume
 - authr(s)
- canexec(s, t) iff subject s can execute transaction t at current time

Axioms

Let S be the set of subjects and T the set of transactions.

- Rule of role assignment: $(\forall s \in S)(\forall t \in T)$ [canexec(s, t) \rightarrow actr(s) $\neq \emptyset$].
 - If *s* can execute a transaction, it has a role
 - This ties transactions to roles
- *Rule of role authorization*: $(\forall s \in S)$ [*actr*(*s*) \subseteq *authr*(*s*)].
 - Subject must be authorized to assume an active role (otherwise, any subject could assume any role)

Axiom

• *Rule of transaction authorization*:

 $(\forall s \in S)(\forall t \in T) [canexec(s, t) \rightarrow t \in trans(actr(s))].$

• If a subject *s* can execute a transaction, then the transaction is an authorized one for the role *s* has assumed

Containment of Roles

 Trainer can do all transactions that trainee can do (and then some). This means role *r* contains role *r* ′ (*r* > *r* ′). So: (∀s ∈ S)[*r*∈ authr(s) ∧ *r* > *r* ′ → *r* ′ ∈ authr(s)]

Separation of Duty

- Let r be a role, and let s be a subject such that r ∈ auth(s). Then the predicate meauth(r) (for mutually exclusive authorizations) is the set of roles that s cannot assume because of the separation of duty requirement.
- Separation of duty:

 $(\forall r_1, r_2 \in R) [r_2 \in meauth(r_1) \rightarrow [(\forall s \in S) [r_1 \in authr(s) \rightarrow r_2 \notin authr(s)]]]$

RBAC Hierarchy

- RBAC₀: basic model (you just saw it)
- RBAC₁: adds role hierarchies to RBAC₀
- RBAC₂: adds constraints to RBAC₀
- RBAC₃: adds both role hierarchies, constraints to RBAC₀
 - It combines RBAC₁ and RBAC₂

RBAC₀, Formally


- Set of users *U*, roles *R*, permissions *P*, sessions *S*
- Relation $PA \subseteq P \times R$ mapping permissions to roles
- Relation $UA \subseteq U \times R$ mapping users to roles
- Function *user*: $S \rightarrow U$ mapping each session to a user
- Function *roles*: $S \rightarrow 2^R$ mapping each session $s \in S$ to a set of roles *roles*(s) \subseteq { $r \in R \mid (user(s), r) \in UA$ }, where s has permissions

 $\bigcup_{r \in roles(s)} \{ p \in P \mid (p, r) \in PA \}$

 When a user assumes role r during session, r and hence the user assuming r gets the set of permissions associated with r

RBAC₁, Intuitively

- Add containment of roles to RBAC₀ (this is the hierarchy)
 - It's a partial ordering
- Each role less powerful than its containing role
 - Containing role contains job functions (permissions) of the contained role
- Can define *private roles* in which one role is subordinate to two others, and those two are not related



RBAC₁, Formally

- Set of users U, roles R, permissions P, sessions S
- Partial order $RH \subseteq R \times R$
 - Write $(r_1, r_2) \in R$ as $r_1 \ge r_2$
- Relation $PA \subseteq P \times R$ mapping permissions to roles
- Relation $UA \subseteq U \times R$ mapping users to roles
- Function *user*: $S \rightarrow U$ mapping each session to a user
- Function roles: $S \rightarrow 2^R$ mapping each session $s \in S$ to a set of roles roles(s) $\subseteq \{ r \in R \mid (\exists r' \geq r)(user(s), r') \in UA \}$, where s has permissions

$$\bigcup_{r \in roles(s)} \{ p \in P \mid (\exists r'' \ge r)(p, r'') \in PA \}$$

• When a user assumes role r with subordinate role r' during session, r and hence the user assuming r gets the set of permissions associated with r, and hence with r'

RBAC₂ and RBAC₃

- RBAC₂ adds constraints on values that components can assume to RBAC₀
 - Example: user can be in only one role at a time
 - Example: make 2 roles mutually exclusive
- RBAC₃ provides both role hierarchies and constraints that determine allowable values for relations and functions
 - Combines RBAC₁ and RBAC₂
- Can be extended to manage role and privilege assignments
 - A set of administrative roles AR and permissions AP defined disjointly from R and P
 - Constraints allow $ap \in AP$ to be assigned to $ar \in AR$ only, and $p \in P$ to $r \in R$ only

Role Engineering

- *Role engineering*: defining roles and determining needed permissions
- Often used when two organizations using RBAC merge
 - Roles in one organization rarely overlap with roles in other
 - Job functions often do overlap
- *Role mining*: analyzing existing roles, permission assignments to determine optimal assignment of permissions to roles
 - NP-complete, but in practice optimal solutions can be approximated or produced

Quiz

Which of the following best describes the difference between roles and the notion of user groups?

- 1. Roles are tied to job functions; user groups are tied to specific projects
- 2. There is no difference; the two are the same
- 3. Roles are tied to specific projects; user groups can include any user
- 4. Roles are tied to job functions; user groups are not