ECS 235B Module 53 Detecting Covert Channels

Detection

- Manner in which resource is shared controls who can send, receive using that resource
 - Noninterference
 - Shared Resource Matrix Methodology
 - Information flow analysis
 - Covert flow trees

Noninterference

- View "read", "write" as instances of information transfer
- Then two processes can communicate if information can be transferred between them, even in the absence of a direct communication path
 - A covert channel
 - Also sounds like interference ...

Example: SAT

- Secure Ada Target, multilevel security policy
- Approach:
 - $\pi(i, l)$ removes all instructions issued by subjects dominated by level l from instruction stream i
 - $A(i, \sigma)$ state resulting from execution of *i* on state σ
 - σ .*v*(*s*) describes subject *s*'s view of state σ
- System is noninterference-secure iff for all instruction sequences *i*, subjects *s* with security level *l*(*s*), states σ,

 $A(\pi(i,\,l(s)),\,\sigma).v(s)=A(i,\,\sigma).v(s)$

Theorem

- Version of the Unwinding Theorem
- Let Σ be set of system states. A specification is noninterference-secure if, for each subject *s* at security level *l*(*s*), there exists an equivalence relation $\equiv: \Sigma \times \Sigma$ such that
 - for $\sigma_1, \sigma_2 \in \Sigma$, when $\sigma_1 \equiv \sigma_2, \sigma_1.v(s) = \sigma_2.v(s)$
 - for $\sigma_1, \sigma_2 \in \Sigma$ and any instruction *i*, when $\sigma_1 \equiv \sigma_2$, $A(i, \sigma_1) \equiv A(i, \sigma_2)$
 - for $\sigma \in \Sigma$ and instruction stream *i*, if $\pi(i, l(s))$ is empty, $A(\pi(i, l(s)), \sigma).v(s) = \sigma.v(s)$

Intuition

- System is noninterference-secure if:
 - Equivalent states have the same view for each subject
 - View remains unchanged if any instruction is executed
 - Instructions from higher-level subjects do not affect the state from the viewpoint of the lower-level subjects

Analysis of SAT

- Focus on object creation instruction and readable object set
- In these specifications:
 - s subject with security level *l*(s)
 - *o* object with security level l(o), type $\tau(o)$
 - σ current state
 - Set of existing objects listed in a global object table $T(\sigma)$

Specification 1

- object_create: $[\sigma' = object_create(s,o,l(o),\tau(o),\sigma) \land \sigma' \neq \sigma]$ \Leftrightarrow $[o \notin T(\sigma) \land l(s) \leq l(o)]$
- The create succeeds if, and only if, the object does not yet exist and the clearance of the object will dominate the clearance of its creator
 - In accord with the "writes up okay" idea

Specification 2

- readable object set: set of existing objects that subject could read
 - can_read(s, o, σ) true if in state σ, o is of a type that s can read (ignoring permissions)
- $o \notin readable(s, \sigma) \Leftrightarrow [o \notin T(\sigma) \lor \neg (l(o) \le l(s)) \lor \neg (can_read(s, o, \sigma))]$
- Can't read a nonexistent object, one with a security level that the subject's security level does not dominate, or object of the wrong type

Specification 3

- SAT enforces tranquility
 - Adding object to readable set means creating new object
- Add to readable set:

 $[o \notin readable(s, \sigma) \land o \in readable(s, \sigma')] \Leftrightarrow \\ [\sigma' = object_create(s, o, l(o), \tau(o), \sigma) \land o \notin T(\sigma) \land l(s') \leq l(o) \leq l(s) \land can_read(s, o, \sigma')]$

 Says object must be created, levels and discretionary access controls set properly

Check for Covert Channels

- σ_1 , σ_2 the same except:
 - *o* exists only in latter
 - $\neg (l(o) \leq l(s))$
- Specification 2:
 - $o \notin readable(s, \sigma_1) \{ o \text{ doesn't exist in } \sigma_1 \}$
 - $o \notin readable(s, \sigma_2) \{ \neg (l(o) \leq l(s)) \}$
- Thus $\sigma_1 \equiv \sigma_2$
 - Condition 1 of theorem holds

Continue Analysis

- *s*' issues command to create *o*:
 - with *l*(*o*) = *l*(*s*); and
 - of type with $can_read(s, o, \sigma_1')$
 - σ_1 ' state after *object_create(s', o, l(o),* $\tau(o), \sigma_1$)
- Specification 1
 - σ_1 differs from σ_1 with *o* in $T(\sigma_1)$
- New entry satisfies:
 - can_read(s, o, σ_1 ')
 - $l(s') \leq l(o) \leq l(s)$, where s' created o

Continue Analysis

• *o* exists in σ_2 so:

$$\sigma_2' = object_create(s', o, \sigma_2) = \sigma_2$$

• But this means

 \neg [A(object_create(s', o, l(o), τ (o), σ_2), σ_2) =

A(object_create(s', o, l(o), τ (o), σ_1), σ_1)]

- Because create fails in σ_2 but succeeds in σ_1
- So condition 2 of theorem fails
- This implies a covert channel as system is not noninterference-secure

Example Exploit

- To send 1:
 - High subject creates high object
 - Recipient tries to create same object but at low
 - Creation fails, but no indication given
 - Recipient gives different subject type permission to read, write object
 - Again fails, but no indication given
 - Subject writes 1 to object, reads it
 - Read returns nothing

Example Exploit

- To send 0:
 - High subject creates nothing
 - Recipient tries to create same object but at low
 - Creation succeeds as object does not exist
 - Recipient gives different subject type permission to read, write object
 - Again succeeds
 - Subject writes 1 to object, reads it
 - Read returns 1

- Can analyze covert storage channels
 - Noninterference techniques reason in terms of security levels (attributes of objects)
- Covert timing channels much harder
 - You would have to make ordering an attribute of the objects in some way

SRMM

- Shared Resource Matrix Methodology
- Goal: identify shared channels, how they are shared
- Steps:
 - Identify all shared resources, their visible attributes [rows]
 - Determine operations that reference (read), modify (write) resource [columns]
 - Contents of matrix show how operation accesses the resource

Example

- Multilevel security model
- File attributes:
 - existence, owner, label, size
- File manipulation operations:
 - read, write, delete, create
 - create succeeds if file does not exist; gets creator as owner, creator's label
 - others require file exists, appropriate labels
- Subjects:
 - High, Low

Shared Resource Matrix

	read	write	delete	create
existence	R	R	R, M	R, M
owner			R	Μ
label	R	R	R	Μ
size	R	Μ	Μ	Μ

Covert Storage Channel

- Properties that must hold for covert storage channel:
 - 1. Sending, receiving processes have access to same *attribute* of shared object;
 - 2. Sender can modify that attribute;
 - 3. Receiver can reference that attribute; and
 - 4. Mechanism for starting processes, properly sequencing their accesses to resource

Example

- Consider attributes with both R, M in rows
- Let High be sender, Low receiver
- create operation both references, modifies existence attribute
 - Low can use this due to semantics of create
- Need to arrange for proper sequencing accesses to existence attribute of file (shared resource)

Use of Channel

- 3 files: ready, done, 1bit
- Low creates *ready* at High level
- High checks that file exists
 - If so, to send 1, it creates 1bit; to send 0, skip
 - Delete *ready*, create *done* at High level
- Low tries to create *done* at High level
 - On failure, High is done
 - Low tries to create 1bit at level High
- Low deletes *done*, creates *ready* at High level

Covert Timing Channel

- Properties that must hold for covert timing channel:
 - 1.Sending, receiving processes have access to same *attribute* of shared object;2.Sender, receiver have access to a time reference (wall clock, timer, event ordering, ...);
 - 3.Sender can control timing of detection of change to that attribute by receiver; and
 - 4. Mechanism for starting processes, properly sequencing their accesses to resource

Example

- Revisit variant of KVM/370 channel
 - Sender, receiver can access ordering of requests by disk arm scheduler (attribute)
 - Sender, receiver have access to the ordering of the requests (time reference)
 - High can control ordering of requests of Low process by issuing cylinder numbers to position arm appropriately (timing of detection of change)
 - So whether channel can be exploited depends on whether there is a mechanism to (1) start sender, receiver and (2) sequence requests as desired

Uses of SRM Methodology

- Applicable at many stages of software life cycle model
 - Flexbility is its strength
- Used to analyze Secure Ada Target
 - Participants manually constructed SRM from flow analysis of SAT model
 - Took transitive closure
 - Found 2 covert channels
 - One used assigned level attribute, another assigned type attribute

Summary

- Methodology comprehensive but incomplete
 - How to identify shared resources?
 - What operations access them and how?
- Incompleteness a benefit
 - Allows use at different stages of software engineering life cycle
- Incompleteness a problem
 - Makes use of methodology sensitive to particular stage of software development

Information Flow Analysis

- When exception occurs due to value of variable, information leaks about the value a covert channel
 - Same for synchronization and IPC primitives, because one process controls when it sends message or blocks to receive one
 - Shared variables are *not* covert channel as they are intended to share values
- Method for identifying covert storage channels in source code
 - Assertion: these arise when processes can view, alter kernel variables
 - So identify these variables
 - May be directly referenced or indirectly referenced via system calls

Step 1

- Identify kernel functions, processes for analysis
 - Processes function at privileged level, but carry out actions for ordinary users
 - Ignore those executing on behalf of administrators (they can leak information directly)
 - Same with system calls available only to system administrator

Step 2

- Identify kernel variables user process can view and/or alter
 - Process must control *how* variable is altered
 - Process must be able to detect *that* variable was altered
- Detection criteria
 - Value of a variable is obtained from system call
 - Calling process can detect at least 2 different states of that variable
- Examples
 - If system call assigns fixed value to a particular variable, process cannot control how that variable is altered
 - If value of x causes an error, state of x can be determined from the error indicator

Directly vs. Indirectly Visible

x directly visible to caller as it is returned directly to caller

y not directly visible to caller, but indirectly visible as its state observed through z

y := func(abc, def);
if y = 0 then
 z := 1;
else
 z := 0;
return z;

Step 3

- Analyze variables looking for covert channels
 - Use method similar to that of SRM
 - Discard primitives associated with variables that can *only* be altered or *only* be viewed
 - Assume recipient's clearance does not dominate sender's, and compare resulting primitives to model of access control

Covert Flow Trees

- Information flow through shared resources modeled using tree
 - Flow paths identified, and analyzed to see if each is legitimate
- 5 types of nodes
 - Goal symbols: states that must exist for information to flow
 - Operation symbol: symbol representing primitive operation
 - Failure symbol: information cannot be sent along the path containing it
 - And symbol: goal reached when these hold for all children
 - If the child is a goal, then the goal is reached; and
 - The child is an operation
 - Or symbol: goal reached when either of these hold for any children
 - If the child is a goal, then the goal is reached; or
 - The child is an operation

More on Goal Symbols

- *Modification goal*: reached when attribute is modified
- *Recognition goal*: reached when modification of attribute is detected
- *Direct recognition goal*: reached when subject can detect modification of attribute by direct reference or calling a function that returns it
- Inferred recognition goal: reached when subject can detect modification of attribute without directly referencing it or calling a function that references attribute directly
- Inferred-via goal: reached when information passed from one attribute to others using specified primitive operation
- *Recognized-new-state goal*: reached when an attribute that was modified when information passed using it is specified by inferred-via goal

Example Program

```
(* lock file if not locked; return *)
procedure Lockfile(f: file): boolean;
                                                (* false if locked, true otherwise *)
begin
        if not f.locked and empty(f.inuse) then
               f.locked := true;
        Lockfile := not f.locked;
end;
procedure Unlockfile(f: file);
                                               (* unlock file *)
begin
        if f.locked then
                f.locked := false;
end;
function Filelocked(f: file): boolean; (* return state of file locking *)
begin
        Filelocked := f.locked;
end;
```

Example Program

```
procedure Openfile(f: file); (* open file if not locked and *)
                                        (* permissions allow it *)
begin
        if not f.locked and read access (process id, f) then
                (* add the process ID to the inuse set *)
                f.inuse = f.inuse + process id;
end;
function Fileopened(f: file): boolean; (* if permissions allow process to read file, *)
begin
                                        (* say if open; else return random value.
                                                                                       *)
        if not read access (process id, f) then
                Fileopened := random(true, false);
        else
                Fileopened := not isempty(f.inuse);
```

end;

Step 1

 Determine attributes that primitive operations reference, modify, return

	Lockfile	Unlockfile	Filelocked	Openfile	Fileopened
reference	locked,inuse	locked	locked	locked,inuse	inuse
modify	locked	Ø	Ø	inuse	Ø
return	Ø	Ø	locked	Ø	inuse

Step 2

- Construct the flow tree; controlled by type of goal
- Construction ends when all paths terminate in either operation symbol of failure symbol
 - If loops occur, a parameter defines number of times path may be traversed

Step 2 (con't)


- Topmost goal: requires attribute be modified and the modification be recognized
 - 1 child (and) with 2 goals (modification, recognition goal symbols)
- Modification goal: requires primitive operation to modify attribute
 - 1 child (*or*) with 1 child operation symbol per operation for all operations that modify attribute
- Recognition goal: subject directly recognize or infer change in attribute
 - 1 child (*or*) with 2 children (direct recognition, inferred recognition goals)

Step 2 (con't)


- Direct recognition goal: operation accesses attribute
 - 1 child (*or*) with 1 child operation symbol per operation for each operation that returns attribute
- Inferred recognition goal: modification referred on basis of 1 or more attributes
 - 1 child (*or*) with 1 child inferred-via symbol per operation for each operation that references an attribute and modifies an attribute
- Inferred-via goal: value of attribute inferred via some operation and new state of attribute recognized
 - 1 child (*and*) with 2 children (operation, recognize-new-state goal symbols)
- Recognize-new-state goal: value of attribute inferred via some operation and new state of attribute recognized, requiring a recognition goal for attribute
 - 1 child (*or*) and for each attribute enabling inference of modification of attribute in question, 1 child (recognition goal symbol)

Example: Goal State and Modification Branch


• The next few slides build covert flow tree for attribute locked




Example: Recognition Branch



Example: Indirect Branch



Example: Recognize New Goal State Branch



Example: Analysis

- Put those parts of the tree together in the obvious way
- First list: ((Lockfile), (Unlockfile))
 - As both modify attribute *locked* and lie on "modified" branch
- Second list: ((Filelocked), (Openfile, Fileopened))
 - From direct recognition of modification of *inuse* attribute; second, from indirect recognition of modification of attribute *locked*
- These result in 4 paths of communication:
 - *Lockfile* followed by *Filelocked*
 - Unlockfile followed by Filelocked
 - Lockfile followed by Openfile, then Fileopened
 - Unlockfile followed by Openfile, then Fileopened

Example: Analysis

- First two sequences in combination represent direct covert storage channel
 - *High* process transmits information to *Low* process by locking, unlocking file
- Last two sequences represent indirect covert storage channel
 - High process locks file to send 0, unlocks to send 1
 - Low process tries to open the file, then uses Fileopened to see if it succeeded
 - If opened, file was not locked and it's a 1; if not opened, file is locked, and it's a 0

Summary

- Covert flow trees, SRM come from idea that covert channels require shared resources that one process can modify and another view
- Both can be used at any point in life cycle
- Covert flow trees identify explicit sequences of operations causing information to flow
 - SRM identifies *channels*, not sequences of operations