Outline for June 1, 2000
- Principles of Secure Design
- Refer to both designing secure systems and securing existing systems
- Speaks to limiting damage
- Principle of Least Privilege
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Give process only those privileges it needs
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Discuss use of roles; examples of systems which violate this (vanilla UNIX) and which maintain this (Secure Xenix)
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Examples in programming (making things setuid to root unnecessarily, limiting protection domain; modularity, robust programming)
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Example attacks (misuse of privileges, etc.)
- Principle of Fail-Safe Defaults
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Default is to deny
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Example of violation: su program
- Principle of Economy of Mechanism
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KISS principle
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Enables quick, easy verification
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Example of complexity: sendmail
- Principle of Complete Mediation
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All accesses must be checked
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Forces system-wide view of controls
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Sources of requests must be identified correatly
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Source of problems: caching (because it may not reflect the state of the system correctly); examples are race conditions, DNS poisoning
- Principle of Open Design
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Designs are open so everyone can examine them and know the limits of the security provided
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Does not apply to cryptographic keys
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Acceptance of reality: they can get this info anyway
- Principle of Separation of Privilege
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Require multiple conditions to be satisfied before granting permission/access/etc.
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Advantage: 2 accidents/errors/etc. must happen together to trigger failure
- Principle of Least Common Mechanism
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Minimize sharing
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New service: in kernel or as a library routine? Latter is better, as each user gets their own copy
- Principle of Psychological Acceptability
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Willingness to use the mechanisms
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Understanding model
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Matching user's goal
- Auditing
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Goals: reconstruction or deduction?
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Relationship to security policy
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Application logs
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System logs
- Example analysis technique
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GOAL methodology
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Do it on local file accesses
- Problems
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Log size
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Impact on system services
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Correllation of disparate logs
- Intrusion detection
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Anomaly detection
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Misuse detection
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Specification detection
- Anomaly detection
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Dorothy Denning's model and IDES
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Useful characteristics (examples)
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Cautions and problems
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Defeating it
- Misuse detection
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TIM (from DEC)
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Rule-based analysis and attack recognition
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Cautions and problems
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Defeating it
- Specification Detection
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Property-Based Testing (introduce specifications here)
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Example
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Cautions and problems
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Defeating it
- Toss in a network
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NSM
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DIDS
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GrIDS
Send email to
bishop@cs.ucdavis.edu.
Department of Computer Science
University of California at Davis
Davis, CA 95616-8562
Page last modified on 6/8/2000