TY  - CONF
N2  - A widely used technique for securing computer systems is to execute programs inside protection domains that enforce established security policies. These containers, often referred to as sandboxes, come in a variety of forms. Although current sandboxing techniques have individual strengths, they also have limitations that reduce the scope of their applicability. In this paper, we give a detailed analysis of the options available to designers of sandboxing mechanisms. As we discuss the tradeoffs of various design choices, we present a sandboxing facility that combines the strengths of a wide variety of design alternatives. Our design provides a set of simple yet powerful primitives that serve as a flexible, general-purpose framework for confining untrusted programs. As we present our work, we compare and contrast it with the work of others and give preliminary results.

AD  - Berkeley, CA, USA
AU  - Peterson, David S.
AU  - Bishop, Matt
AU  - Pandey, Raju
T2  - Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Security Symposium
Y2  - Aug.
PG  - 207
EP  - -225
SP  - USENIX Association
T1  - A Flexible Containment Mechanism for Executing Untrusted Code
PY  - 2002
ER  -