The Insider Problem

Collaborators: Prof. Sophie Engle (USF); Dr. Carrie Gates (CA Labs); Prof. Sean Peisert (UC Davis and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)

The “insider” problem traditionally involves one who is trusted or who has access to data or resources. However, the literature gives many different definitions of the “insider”, often in terms of a particular solution. This project looks at the insider problem as one of access plus other factors. This leads to a non-binary definition of “insider”.

Papers

• M. Bishop, C. Gates, D. Frincke, and F. Greitzer, “AZALIA: an A to Z Assessment of the Likelihood of Insider Attack,” Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Technologies for Homeland Security (May 2009).
• M. Bishop, S. Engle, S. Peisert, S. Whalen, and C. Gates, “Case Studies of an Insider Framework,” Proceedings of the 42nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (Jan. 2009).
• M. Bishop, S. Engle, S. Peisert, S. Whalen, and C. Gates, “We Have Met the Enemy And He Is Us,” Proceedings of the 2008 Workshop on New Security Paradigms pp. 1–12 (Sep. 2008).
• M. Bishop and C. Gates, “Defining the Insider Threat,” Proceedings of the Cyber Security and Information Intelligence Research Workshop article 15 (May 2008).
• M. Bishop, “Position: ‘Insider’ is Relative,” Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop pp. 77–78 (Sep. 2005).
• M. Bishop, “The Insider Problem Revisited,” Proceedings of the New Security Paradigms Workshop pp. 75–76 (Sep. 2005).