Outline for May 3, 2005
Reading: §10.4.2, §10.5.2, §10.6, §12
Outline
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Cryptographic Key Infrastructure
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Certificates (X.509, PGP)
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Certificate, key revocation
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Digital Signatures
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Judge can confirm, to the limits of technology, that claimed signer did sign message
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RSA digital signatures: sign, then encipher
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Authentication:
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Basis: what you know/have/are, where you are
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Passwords
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How UNIX does selection
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Problem: common passwords
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May be pass phrases: goal is to make search space as large as possible, distribution as uniform as possible
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Other ways to force good password selection: random, pronounceable, computer-aided selection
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Go through problems, approaches to each, esp. proactive
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Password Storage
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In the clear; MULTICS story
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Enciphered; key must be kept available; get to it and it's all over
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Hashed; present idea of one-way functions using identity and sum; show UNIX version, including salt
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Attack Schemes Directed to the Passwords
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Exhaustive search: UNIX is 1-8 chars, say 96 possibles; it's about 7e16
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Inspired guessing: think of what people would like (see above)
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Random guessing: can't defend against it; bad login messages aid it
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Scavenging: passwords often typed where they might be recorded (as login name, in other contexts, etc.)
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Ask the user: very common with some public access services
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Expected time to guess
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Password aging
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Pick age so when password is guessed, it's no longer valid
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Implementation: track previous passwords vs. upper, lower time bounds
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Ultimate in aging: One-Time Password
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Password is valid for only one use
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May work from list, or new password may be generated from old by a function
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Example: S/Key
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Challenge-response systems
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Computer issues challenge, user presents response to verify secret information known/item possessed
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Example operations: f(x) = x+1, random, string (for users without computers), time of day, computer sends E(x), you answer E(D(E(x))+1)
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Note: password never sent on wire or network
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Attack: man-in-the-middle
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Defense: mutual authentication
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