

# Lecture 11, April 22, 2026

# RSA

- First described publicly in 1978
  - Unknown at the time: Clifford Cocks developed a similar cryptosystem in 1973, but it was classified until recently
- Exponentiation cipher
- Relies on the difficulty of determining the number of numbers relatively prime to a large integer  $n$

# Example: Authentication/Integrity

- Alice wants to send Bob the message PUPPIESARESMALL in such a way that Bob knows it comes from her and nothing was changed during the transmission
  - Same public, private keys as before
- Encipher using private key:
  - $152015^{95857} \bmod 262631 = 072798$
  - $150804^{95857} \bmod 262631 = 259757$
  - $180017^{95857} \bmod 262631 = 256449$
  - $041812^{95857} \bmod 262631 = 089234$
  - $001111^{95857} \bmod 262631 = 037974$
- Alice sends 072798 259757 256449 089234 037974
- Bob receives, uses Alice's public key to decipher it

# Example: Both (Sending)

- Same  $n$  as for Alice; Bob chooses  $e = 45593$ , making  $d = 235457$
- Alice wants to send PUPPIESARESMALL (152015 150804 180017 041812 001111) confidentially and authenticated
- Encipher:
  - $(152015^{95857} \bmod 262631)^{45593} \bmod 262631 = 249123$
  - $(150804^{95857} \bmod 262631)^{45593} \bmod 262631 = 166008$
  - $(180017^{95857} \bmod 262631)^{45593} \bmod 262631 = 146608$
  - $(041812^{95857} \bmod 262631)^{45593} \bmod 262631 = 092311$
  - $(001111^{95857} \bmod 262631)^{45593} \bmod 262631 = 096768$
- So Alice sends 249123 166008 146608 092311 096768

# Example: Both (Receiving)

- Bob receives 249123 166008 146608 092311 096768
- Decipher:
  - $(249123^{235457} \bmod 262631)^{154993} \bmod 262631 = 152012$
  - $(166008^{235457} \bmod 262631)^{154993} \bmod 262631 = 150804$
  - $(146608^{235457} \bmod 262631)^{154993} \bmod 262631 = 180017$
  - $(092311^{235457} \bmod 262631)^{154993} \bmod 262631 = 041812$
  - $(096768^{235457} \bmod 262631)^{154993} \bmod 262631 = 001111$
- So Alice sent him 152015 150804 180017 041812 001111
  - Which translates to PUP PIE SAR ESM ALL or PUPPIESARESMALL

# Security Services

- Confidentiality
  - Only the owner of the private key knows it, so text enciphered with public key cannot be read by anyone except the owner of the private key
- Authentication
  - Only the owner of the private key knows it, so text enciphered with private key must have been generated by the owner

# More Security Services

- Integrity
  - Enciphered letters cannot be changed undetectably without knowing private key
- Non-Repudiation
  - Message enciphered with private key came from someone who knew it

# Warnings

- Encipher message in blocks considerably larger than the examples here
  - If only characters per block, RSA can be broken using statistical attacks (just like symmetric cryptosystems)
- Attacker cannot alter letters, but can rearrange them and alter message meaning
  - Example: reverse enciphered message of text ON to get NO

# El Gamal Cryptosystem

- Based on discrete logarithm problem
  - Given integers  $n$ ,  $g$ , and  $b$  with  $0 \leq a < n$  and  $0 \leq b < n$ ; then find an integer  $k$  such that  $0 \leq k < n$  and  $a = g^k \pmod n$
  - Choose  $n$  to be a prime  $p$
  - Solutions known for small  $p$
  - Solutions computationally infeasible as  $p$  grows large

# Algorithm

- Choose prime  $p$  with  $p - 1$  having a large factor
- Choose generator  $g$  such that  $1 < g < p$
- Choose  $k_{priv}$  such that  $1 < k_{priv} < p - 1$
- Set  $y = g^{k_{priv}} \bmod p$
- Then public key  $k_{pub} = (p, g, y)$  and private key is  $k_{priv}$

# Example

- Alice:  $p = 262643$ ;  $g = 9563$ ,  $k_{priv} = 3632$ 
  - $262643 = 2 \times 131321$ , also prime
- Alice's public key  $k_{pub} = (262643, 9563, 27459)$ 
  - As  $y = g^{k_{priv}} \bmod p = 9563^{3632} \bmod 262643 = 27459$

# Enciphering and Deciphering

Encipher message  $m$ :

- Choose random integer  $k$  relatively prime to  $p - 1$
- Compute  $c_1 = g^k \bmod p$ ;  $c_2 = my^k \bmod p$
- Ciphertext is  $c = (c_1, c_2)$

Decipher ciphertext  $(c_1, c_2)$

- Compute  $m = c_2 c_1^{-k_{priv}} \bmod p$
- Message is  $m$

# Example Encryption

- Bob wants to send Alice PUPPIESARESMALL
- Message to send: 152015 150804 180017 041812 001111
- First block: choose  $k = 5$ 
  - $c_{1,1} = 9563^5 \bmod 262643 = 15653$
  - $c_{1,2} = (152015)27459^5 \bmod 262643 = 923$
- Next block: choose  $k = 3230$ 
  - $c_{2,1} = 9563^{3230} \bmod 262643 = 46495$
  - $c_{2,2} = (150804)27459^{3230} \bmod 262643 = 109351$
- Continuing, enciphered message is (15653,923), (46495,109351), (176489,208811), (88247,144749), (152432,5198)

# Example Decryption

Alice receives (15653,923), (46495,109351), (176489,208811), (88247,144749), (152432,5198)

- First block:  $(923)15653^{-3632} \bmod 262643 = 152015$
- Second block:  $(109351)46495^{-3632} \bmod 262643 = 150804$
- Third block:  $(208811)176489^{-3632} \bmod 262643 = 180017$
- Fourth block:  $(144749)88247^{-3632} \bmod 262643 = 41812$
- Fifth block:  $(5198)152432^{-3632} \bmod 262643 = 1111$

So the message is 152015 150804 180017 041812 001111


- Which translates to “PUP PIE SAR ESM ALL” or PUPPIESARESMALL

# Notes

- Same letter enciphered twice produces two different ciphertexts
  - Defeats replay attacks
- If the integer  $k$  is used twice, and an attacker has plaintext for one of those messages, deciphering the other is easy
- $c_2$  linear function of  $m$ , so forgery possible
  - $m$  message,  $(c_1, c_2)$  ciphertext; then  $(c_1, nc_2)$  is ciphertext corresponding to message  $nm$

# Elliptic Curve Ciphers

- Miller and Koblitz proposed this
- *Elliptic curve* is a curve of the form  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ 
  - Curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 4x + 10$  plotted at right
- Can be applied to any cryptosystem depending on discrete log problem
- Advantage: keys shorter than other forms of public key cryptosystems, so computation time shorter



# Basics

- Take 2 points on the elliptic curve  $P_1, P_2$ 
  - If  $P_1 \neq P_2$ , draw line through them
  - If  $P_1 = P_2$ , draw a tangent to curve there
- If line intersects curve at  $P_3 = (x_3, y_3)$ 
  - Take the sum of  $P_1, P_2$  to be  $P_4 = (x_3, -y_3)$
- Otherwise, line is vertical, so take  $P_1 = (x, y)$ ; treat  $\infty$  as another point of intersection; third point of intersection is  $P_2 = (x, -y)$ 
  - Given above definition of addition,  $P_1 + \infty = (x, y) = P_1$
  - So  $\infty$  is additive identity

# The Math

- $P_1 = (x_1, y_1); P_2 = (x_2, y_2)$
- Then if  $P_1 \neq P_2$ ,  $m = (y_2 - y_1) / (x_2 - x_1)$
- Otherwise,  $m = (3x_1^2 + a) / y_1$
- Next,  $P_3 = P_1 + P_2 = (m^2 - x_1 - x_2, m(x_1 - x_3) - y_1) = (x_3, y_3)$
- And  $P_4 = (x_4, y_4)$ , where  $x_4 = x_3, y_4 = -y_3$ 
  - $P_4$  defined to be sum of  $P_1, P_2$

# Basis for the Cryptosystem

- Curve:  $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ , where  $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$  and  $p$  prime
- Pick a point  $P$  and add it to itself  $n$  times; call this  $Q$ , so  $Q = nP$ 
  - If  $n$  is large, generally very hard to compute  $n$  from  $P$  and  $Q$
- So, elliptic curve cryptosystem has 4 parameters  $(a, b, p, P)$
- Private key  $k_{priv}$  chosen randomly such that  $k_{priv} < p$ 
  - In practice, choose  $k_{priv}$  to be less than number of integer points on curve
- Public key  $k_{pub} = k_{priv} P$
- In what follows,  $(x, y) \pmod{p} = (x \pmod{p}, y \pmod{p})$

# Elliptic Curve El Gamal Cryptosystem

- Choose a point  $P$  on the curve, and a private key  $k_{priv}$
- Compute  $Q = k_{priv}P$
- Public key is  $(P, Q, a, p)$

Encipher: express message as point  $m$  on curve; choose random number  $k$

- $c_1 = kP; c_2 = m + kQ$
- Ciphertext is  $(c_1, c_2)$

Decipher:

- $m = c_2 - k_{priv}c_1$
- Message is  $m$

# Example: Encryption

- Alice, Bob agree to use the curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 4x + 14 \pmod{2503}$  and the point  $P = (1002, 493)$
  - Bob chooses private key  $k_{priv,Bob} = 1847$ 
    - Public key  $k_{pub,Bob} = k_{priv,Bob}P = 1847(1002, 493) \pmod{2503} = (460, 2083)$
  - Alice wants to send Bob message  $m = (18, 1394)$ 
    - She chooses random  $k = 717$
    - $c_1 = kP = 717(1002, 493) \pmod{2503} = (2134, 419)$
    - $c_2 = m + k k_{pub,Bob} = (18, 1394) + 717(460, 2083) \pmod{2503} = (221, 1253)$
- so she sends Bob  $c_1$  and  $c_2$

# Example: Decryption

- From last slide, Alice, Bob agree to use the curve  $y^2 = x^3 + 4x + 14 \pmod{2503}$  and the point  $P = (1002, 493)$ 
  - Bob's private key  $k_{priv,Bob} = 1847$
  - Bob's public key  $k_{pub,Bob} (460, 2083)$
- To decrypt  $c_1 = (2134, 419)$ ,  $c_2 = (221, 1253)$ , Bob computes:
  - $k_{priv,Bob}c_1 = 1847(2134, 419) \pmod{2503} = (652, 1943)$
  - $m = c_2 - c_1 = (221, 1253) - (652, 1943) \pmod{2503} = (18, 1394)$

obtaining the message Alice sent

# Selection of Elliptic Curves

- For elliptic curves for cryptography, selection of parameters critical
  - Example:  $b = 0$ ,  $p \bmod 4 = 3$  makes the underlying discrete log problem significantly easier to solve
  - Example: so does  $a = 0$ ,  $p \bmod 3 = 2$
- Several such curves are recommended:
  - U.S. NIST: P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384, P-521 using a prime modulus and a binary field of degree 163, 233, 283, 409, 571
  - Certicom: same, but degree 239 binary field instead of degree 233 binary field
  - Others: Curve1174, Curve25519

# Cryptographic Checksums

- Mathematical function to generate a set of  $k$  bits from a set of  $n$  bits (where  $k \leq n$ ).
  - $k$  is smaller than  $n$  except in unusual circumstances
- Example: ASCII parity bit
  - ASCII has 7 bits; 8th bit is “parity”
  - Even parity: even number of 1 bits
  - Odd parity: odd number of 1 bits

# Example Use

- Bob receives “10111101” as bits.
  - Sender is using even parity; 6 1 bits, so character was received correctly
    - Note: could be garbled, but 2 bits would need to have been changed to preserve parity
  - Sender is using odd parity; even number of 1 bits, so character was not received correctly

# Definition

- Cryptographic checksum  $h: A \rightarrow B$ :
  1. For any  $x \in A$ ,  $h(x)$  is easy to compute
  2. For any  $y \in B$ , it is computationally infeasible to find  $x \in A$  such that  $h(x) = y$
  3. It is computationally infeasible to find two inputs  $x, x' \in A$  such that  $x \neq x'$  and  $h(x) = h(x')$ 
    - Alternate form (stronger): Given any  $x \in A$ , it is computationally infeasible to find a different  $x' \in A$  such that  $h(x) = h(x')$ .

# Collisions

- If  $x \neq x'$  and  $h(x) = h(x')$ ,  $x$  and  $x'$  are a *collision*
  - Pigeonhole principle: if there are  $n$  containers for  $n+1$  objects, then at least one container will have at least 2 objects in it.
  - Application: if there are 32 files and 8 possible cryptographic checksum values, at least one value corresponds to at least 4 files

# Keys

- Keyed cryptographic checksum: requires cryptographic key
  - AES in chaining mode: encipher message, use last  $n$  bits. Requires a key to encipher, so it is a keyed cryptographic checksum.
- Keyless cryptographic checksum: requires no cryptographic key
  - SHA-512, SHA-3 are examples; older ones include MD4, MD5, RIPEM, SHA-0, and SHA-1 (methods for constructing collisions are known for these)