Outline for November 1, 2005
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Access control and systems
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Access Control Lists
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UNIX method
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ACLs: describe, revocation issue
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Windows and ACLs
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Capabilities
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Capability-based addressing: show picture of accessing object
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Show process limiting access by not inheriting all parent's capabilities
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Revocation: use of a global descriptor table
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Levels of privilege
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MULTICS ring mechanism
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MULTICS rings: used for both data and procedures; rights are REWA
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(b1, b2) access bracket - can access freely; (b3, b4) call bracket - can call segment through gate; so if a's access bracket is (32,35) and its call bracket is (36,39), then assuming permission mode (REWA) allows access, a procedure in:
rings 0-31: can access a, but ring-crossing fault occurs
rings 32-35: can access a, no ring-crossing fault
rings 36-39: can access a, provided a valid gate is used as an entry point
rings 40-63: cannot access a -
If the procedure is accessing a data segment d, no call bracket allowed; given the above, assuming permission mode (REWA) allows access, a procedure in:
rings 0-32: can access d
rings 33-35: can access d, but cannot write to it (W or A)
rings 36-63: cannot access d
Puzzle of the Day
Define spam. In particular, what distinguishes spam from unsolicited e-mail?
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