Outline for January 18, 2012

Reading: §3.3

  1. Sharing
    1. Definition: can•share(α, x, y, G0) iff there exists a sequence of protection graphs G0, . . ., Gn such that that G0 |−*Gn using only take, grant, create, remove rules and in Gn, there is an edge from x to y labeled α
    2. Theorem: can•share(α, x, y, G0) iff there is an edge from x to y labeled α in G0, or all of the following hold:
      1. there is a vertex y′ with an edge from y′ to y labeled α;
      2. there is a subject y′′ which terminally spans to y′, or y′′ = y′;
      3. there is a subject x′ which initially spans to x&, or x′ = x; and
      4. there is a sequence of islands I1, . . ., In connected by bridges for which x′ ∈ I1 and y′ ∈ In.
  2. Model Interpretation
    1. ACM very general, broadly applicable; Take-Grant more specific, can model fewer situations
    2. Theorem: G0 protection graph with exactly one subject, no edges; R set of rights. Then G0, . . ., Gn iff G0 is a finite directed graph containing subjects and objects only, with edges labeled from nonempty subsets of R, and with at least one subject with no incoming edges
    3. Example: shared buffer managed by trusted third party
  3. Stealing
    1. Definition: can•steal(α, x, y, G0) iff there is no edge from x to y labeled α in G0, and there exists a sequence of protection graphs G0, . . ., Gn such that G0 |−*Gn in which:
      1. Gn has an edge from x to y labeled α
      2. There is a sequence of rule applications ρ1, . . ., ρn such that Gi−1 |−Gi; and
      3. For all vertices v, w ∈ Gi−1, if there is an edge from v to y in G0 labeled α, then ρ, is not of the form “v grants (α to y) to w”
    2. Example
  4. Conspiracy
    1. Access set
    2. Deletion set
    3. Conspiracy graph
    4. I, T sets
    5. Theorem: can•steal(α, x, y, G0) iff there is a path from some h(p) ∈ I(x) to some h(q) ∈ T(y)

A PDF version is available here.
UC Davis sigil
ECS 235B, Foundations of Computer and Information Security
Winter Quarter 2012