Outline for April 17, 2006
Reading: text, §5.2, 30
- Greetings and felicitations!
- Lattice models
- Poset, ≤ the relation
- Reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive
- Greatest lower bound, least upper bound
- Example with complex numbers
- Bell-LaPadula Model (security levels)
- Security clearance, categories, levels
- Simple security condition (no reads up)
- *-property (no writes down)
- Discretionary security property
- Basic Security Theorem: if it is secure and transformations
follow these rules, it will remain secure
- Bell-LaPadula Model
- Apply lattice work
- Set of classes SC is a partially ordered set
under relation dom with glb (greatest lower bound),
lub (least upper bound) operators
- Note: dom is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric
- Example: (A, C) dom (A′, C′) iff A ≤ A′ and C ⊆ C′; lub((A, C), (A′, C′)) = (max(A, A′), C ∪ C′), glb((A, C), (A′, C′)) = (min(A, A′), C ∩ C′)
- Simple security condition (no reads up)
- *-property (no writes down)
- Discretionary security property
- Basic Security Theorem: if it is secure and transformations
follow these rules, it will remain secure
- Maximum, current security level
- BLP: formally
- Elements of system: si subjects,
oi objects
- State space V = B×M×F×H where:
B set of current accesses (i.e., access modes each subject has currently to each object);
M access permission matrix;
F consists of 3 functions: fs is security level associated with each subject, fo security level associated with each object, and fc current security level for each subject
H hierarchy of system objects, functions h: O→P(O) with two properties:
- If oi ≠ oj, then h(oi) ∩ h(oj) = ∅
- There is no set { o1, ..., ok } ⊆ O such that for each i, oi+1 ∈ h(oi) and ok+1 = o1.
- Set of requests is R
- Set of decisions is D
- W ⊆ R×D×V×V is motion from one state to another.
- System Σ(R, D, W, z0) ⊆ X×Y×Z such that (x, y, z) ∈ Σ(R, D, W, z0) iff (xt, yt, zt, zt-1) ∈ W for each i ∈ T; latter is an action of system
- Theorem: Σ(R, D, W, z0) satisfies the simple security property for any initial state z0 that satisfies the simple security property iff W satisfies the following conditions for each action (ri, di, (b′, m′, f′, h′), (b, m, f, h)):
- each (s, o, x) ∈ b′ − b satisfies the simple security condition relative to f′ (i.e., x is not read, or x is read and fs(s) dom fo(o))
- if (s, o, x) ∈ b does not satisfy the simple security condition relative to f′, then (s, o, x) ∉ b′
- Theorem: Σ(R, D, W, z0) satisfies the *-property relative to S′ ⊆ S, for any initial state z0 that satisfies the *-property relative to S′ iff W satisfies the following conditions for each (ri, di, (b′, m′, f′, h′), (b, m, f, h)):
- for each s ∈ S′, any (s, o, x) ∈ b′ − b satisfies the *-property with respect to f′
- for each s ∈ S′, if (s, o, x) ∈ b does not satisfy the *-property with respect to f′, then (s, o, x) ∉ b′
- Theorem: Σ(R, D, W, z0) satisfies the ds-property iff the initial state z0 satisfies the ds-property and W satisfies the following conditions for each action (ri, di, (b′, m′, f′, h′), (b, m, f, h)):
- if (s, o, x) ∈ b′ − b, then x ∈ m′[s, o];
- if (s, o, x) ∈ b and x ∈ m′[s, o] then (s, o, x) ∉ b′
Version of April 17, 2006 at 12:25 PM
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