Outline for January 18, 2012

Reading: §3.3

  1. Sharing
    1. Definition: can•share(α, x, y, G0) iff there exists a sequence of protection graphs G0, . . ., Gn such that that G0 |−*Gn using only take, grant, create, remove rules and in Gn, there is an edge from x to y labeled α
    2. Theorem: can•share(α, x, y, G0) iff there is an edge from x to y labeled α in G0, or all of the following hold:
      1. there is a vertex y′ with an edge from y′ to y labeled α;
      2. there is a subject y′′ which terminally spans to y′, or y′′ = y′;
      3. there is a subject x′ which initially spans to x&, or x′ = x; and
      4. there is a sequence of islands I1, . . ., In connected by bridges for which x′I1 and y′In.
  2. Model Interpretation
    1. ACM very general, broadly applicable; Take-Grant more specific, can model fewer situations
    2. Theorem: G0 protection graph with exactly one subject, no edges; R set of rights. Then G0, . . ., Gn iff G0 is a finite directed graph containing subjects and objects only, with edges labeled from nonempty subsets of R, and with at least one subject with no incoming edges
    3. Example: shared buffer managed by trusted third party
  3. Stealing
    1. Definition: can•steal(α, x, y, G0) iff there is no edge from x to y labeled α in G0, and there exists a sequence of protection graphs G0, . . ., Gn such that G0 |−*Gn in which:
      1. Gn has an edge from x to y labeled α
      2. There is a sequence of rule applications ρ1, . . ., ρn such that Gi−1 |−Gi; and
      3. For all vertices v, wGi−1, if there is an edge from v to y in G0 labeled α, then ρ, is not of the form “v grants (α to y) to w
    2. Example
  4. Conspiracy
    1. Access set
    2. Deletion set
    3. Conspiracy graph
    4. I, T sets
    5. Theorem: can•steal(α, x, y, G0) iff there is a path from some h(p) ∈ I(x) to some h(q) ∈ T(y)

A PDF version is available here.
UC Davis sigil
ECS 235B, Foundations of Computer and Information Security
Winter Quarter 2012