Outline for April 17, 2006

Reading: text, §5.2, 30

  1. Greetings and felicitations!
  2. Lattice models
    1. Poset, ≤ the relation
    2. Reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive
    3. Greatest lower bound, least upper bound
    4. Example with complex numbers
  3. Bell-LaPadula Model (security levels)
    1. Security clearance, categories, levels
    2. Simple security condition (no reads up)
    3. *-property (no writes down)
    4. Discretionary security property
    5. Basic Security Theorem: if it is secure and transformations follow these rules, it will remain secure
  4. Bell-LaPadula Model
    1. Apply lattice work
      1. Set of classes SC is a partially ordered set under relation dom with glb (greatest lower bound), lub (least upper bound) operators
      2. Note: dom is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric
      3. Example: (A, C) dom (A′, C′) iff AA′ and CC′; lub((A, C), (A′, C′)) = (max(A, A′), CC′), glb((A, C), (A′, C′)) = (min(A, A′), CC′)
    2. Simple security condition (no reads up)
    3. *-property (no writes down)
    4. Discretionary security property
    5. Basic Security Theorem: if it is secure and transformations follow these rules, it will remain secure
    6. Maximum, current security level
  5. BLP: formally
    1. Elements of system: si subjects, oi objects
    2. State space V = B×M×F×H where:
      B set of current accesses (i.e., access modes each subject has currently to each object);
      M access permission matrix; F consists of 3 functions: fs is security level associated with each subject, fo security level associated with each object, and fc current security level for each subject
      H hierarchy of system objects, functions h: OP(O) with two properties:
      1. If oioj, then h(oi) ∩ h(oj) = ∅
      2. There is no set { o1, ..., ok } ⊆ O such that for each i, oi+1h(oi) and ok+1 = o1.
    3. Set of requests is R
    4. Set of decisions is D
    5. WR×D×V×V is motion from one state to another.
    6. System Σ(R, D, W, z0) ⊆ X×Y×Z such that (x, y, z) ∈ Σ(R, D, W, z0) iff (xt, yt, zt, zt-1) ∈ W for each iT; latter is an action of system
    7. Theorem: Σ(R, D, W, z0) satisfies the simple security property for any initial state z0 that satisfies the simple security property iff W satisfies the following conditions for each action (ri, di, (b′, m′, f′, h′), (b, m, f, h)):
      1. each (s, o, x) ∈ b′b satisfies the simple security condition relative to f′ (i.e., x is not read, or x is read and fs(s) dom fo(o))
      2. if (s, o, x) ∈ b does not satisfy the simple security condition relative to f′, then (s, o, x) ∉ b′
    8. Theorem: Σ(R, D, W, z0) satisfies the *-property relative to S′S, for any initial state z0 that satisfies the *-property relative to S′ iff W satisfies the following conditions for each (ri, di, (b′, m′, f′, h′), (b, m, f, h)):
      1. for each sS′, any (s, o, x) ∈ b′b satisfies the *-property with respect to f′
      2. for each sS′, if (s, o, x) ∈ b does not satisfy the *-property with respect to f′, then (s, o, x) ∉ b′
    9. Theorem: Σ(R, D, W, z0) satisfies the ds-property iff the initial state z0 satisfies the ds-property and W satisfies the following conditions for each action (ri, di, (b′, m′, f′, h′), (b, m, f, h)):
      1. if (s, o, x) ∈ b′b, then xm′[s, o];
      2. if (s, o, x) ∈ b and xm′[s, o] then (s, o, x) ∉ b′

Version of April 17, 2006 at 12:25 PM

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