Overview of Red Team Reports

Citation

• M. Bishop, “Overview of Red Team Reports”, Office of the Secretary of State of California, 1500 11th St, Sacramento, CA 95814 (July 2007).

Paper

• PDF
• PS

About This Report

From the Executive Summary:

The California Secretary of State entered into a contract with the University of California to test the security of three electronic voting systems as part of her top to bottom review. Each “red team” was to try to compromise the accuracy, security, and integrity of the voting systems without making assumptions about compensating controls or procedural mitigation measures that vendors, the Secretary of State, or individual counties may have adopted. The red teams demonstrated that, under these conditions, the technology and security of all three systems could be compromised.

Background

I was asked to oversee the red team effort of the California Secretary of State’s top to bottom review of all electronic voting systems certified for use in California. The red teams ended up reviewing three systems:

• the Diebold GEMS 1.18.24/AccuVote system;
• the Hart Intercivic System 6.2.1 system; and
• the Sequoia WinEDS version 3.1.012/Edge/Insight/400-C system.

This provides context for the three reports, each written by the team that did the analysis.

This is a local copy. The definitive version is available at http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ttbr/red_overview.pdf