Auditing Voting Systems While Preserving Secrecy and Anonymity

Collaborator: Prof. Sean Peisert (UC Davis and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory)
Sponsor: National Science Foundation

In an election, auditing verifies that the systems and procedures work as intended, and that the votes have been counted correctly. If a problem arises, forensic techniques determine what happened and how it can be compensated for (or determine it cannot be). Complicating this problem is that the same audit trails that enable analysis of failures can be made contain information that either exposes the identity of the voter, and enables voter coercion; or information that communicates a message to an auditor, enabling vote selling. This project is examining what information is needed to assess whether e-voting machines can operate with the desired degree of assurance, and respect laws relating to anonymity and privacy. If the technology used in portions of the infrastructure beyond our control does not provide the necessary information, what requirements must an infrastructure supporting e-voting machines meet. We are working with election officials in two counties in California to ensure practicality of the approach and dissemination of knowledge.